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ABSTRACT 
In 1972, U.S. Agriculture Secretary Earl L. Butz commented, "The grain trade is one of 
the most fiercely competitive industries in this country;" yet to the general public, the grain trade 
is a largely unknown entity.1 Sowing the Wild Oats seeks to address some of the gaps in our 
knowledge of the grain industry created by the industry’s general invisibility and a lack of 
writing on the topic, particularly in reference to the latter half of the twentieth century. In the 
mid-twentieth century, a major investigation of the New Orleans grain trade sparked national 
changes affecting the entire United States grain industry. The Gulf port also played a central role 
in determining global grain prices and facilitating international trade, making it one of the most 
influential ports in the world. As journalist Dan Morgan succinctly puts it, “New Orleans is to 
grain what Bahrein is to oil.”2 Through centuries of expansion and generations of employees, the 
secrecy of the industry allowed things to transpire that would have lasting effects once they were 
uncovered in the 1970s.3 The whole system unraveled in less than a decade simply because a 
massive grain sale to the Soviet Union in 1972, conducted behind closed doors, led to suspicions 
of theft on the New Orleans docks in 1975. The story of the Louisiana grain industry is filled as 
much with fraud, explosions, theft, and threats, as it is with trade negotiations and crop news. 
                                               
1 James Trager, The Great Grain Robbery (New York: Ballantine Books, 1975), 160. 
2 Dan Morgan, Merchants of Grain (New York: The Viking Press, 1979), 313. 
3 According to Morgan, “the transformation of the global economy” at this time brought the gain 
companies to the forefront of public interest. In the succeeding decades, the scandals of the industry were 
quickly forgotten and the companies are just as elusive as they were in the early twentieth century. See 
Morgan, Merchants of Grain, vii. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 There was a grain investigation by the government and we went through a really tough, tough time with the 
 FBI and the grain inspectors and all that. There was a couple of people that I knew at that time that got  
 indicted. And they spent a little time in jail but not that much. . . . . You were constantly under pressure. I  
 was accused of a lot of things by the FBI and none of them were true. But they pistol whip you just about  
 every way they could. 
   -John Beach, Superintendent of the New Orleans Public Grain Elevator, early 1970s1 
When asked in a 2014 interview what the most difficult thing in his life had been, John 
Beach revealed he had been under investigation by the FBI while working as the superintendent 
of the Public Grain Elevator in New Orleans in the 1970s. His memory of the events around the 
investigation and its specific motives have gotten understandably hazy with age but he does 
remember seeking guidance from his preacher throughout the ordeal. That detail generates a 
narrative similar to the classic Marlon Brando film On the Waterfront (1954). With its mob 
bosses and labor unrest, any comparison to that film suggests the New Orleans investigation had 
something major at stake. Grain, being a staple of diets around the world, is a revenue generating 
powerhouse and one has to wonder if New Orleans’ storied past with the mafia had led to 
widespread corruption on the docks. Agents working this particular case have stated that it was a 
fully internalized operation, meaning only grain companies and their employees were involved.2 
The American grain industry is renowned worldwide for its highly secretive existence and 
perhaps even the mafia, as powerful as it is, could not crack that shell.  
Although he was not charged with anything, Beach makes it seem like federal 
investigations were just part of the day-to-day operations of the elevator: “You were always 
                                               
1 John Beach, Personal Communication, June 2014. 
2 Robert Isakson, Unprocessed Oral History Interview conducted March 24, 2018. Property of the T. 
Harry Williams Center for Oral History at Louisiana State University. 
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under the gun for these kinds of things because you’re dealing with a lot of money on the screen 
all the time. You don’t even [know] . . . If it wasn’t bad, they would claim it was bad and then 
that just opened up Pandora’s box.”3 Whether his work as elevator superintendent was truly 
being constantly watched, Beach’s brief statement in 2014 certainly opened Pandora’s box in 
trying to explain and understand how something like the grain industry could find itself mixed up 
with the feds. What criminal activity could possibly come out of something so simple? It turns 
out, the big business to be found in grain is highly susceptible to fraud and theft. The political 
climate of the 1970s was almost as turbulent as that of the Trump years but the FBI had just 
begun pursuing large cases of fraud and corruption. Publicly accessible information about the 
grain case has become limited over time and an online search yields only a few New York Times 
articles, giving the impression that the case was not significant and quickly disappeared. But this 
limitation could also raise questions of whether there was pressure to withhold information and 
make the case go away. The flat truth is there was constant press coverage of the case, both in 
the local papers and national ones like the New York Times and Chicago Tribune, that coverage 
has just become buried in the depths of the digital archive.  
For those like Clara Beach who made a habit of saving clippings from the local news, 
information on the case was limited simply because only a few papers were available in the area. 
Even though she was well aware of the investigation because she often saw agents outside her 
home, she was surprised at how much she did not know about her husband, John Beach's, 
industry. That information was just not accessible to her primarily because the operation of the 
grain industry has been a carefully guarded secret for generations. When journalists did venture 
to document industry news, it was difficult to explain the inner workings of the elevators to the 
                                               
3 John Beach, Unprocessed Oral History Interview conducted December 23, 2017. Property of the T. 
Harry Williams Center for Oral History at Louisiana State University. 
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uninitiated. Clara remarked in her 2018 oral history interview, "I never worried about him all that 
time, but afterwards I realized how dangerous it was where he was working."4 Not only was her 
husband under potential scrutiny much of the time, his life was put on the line numerous times 
because of dust problems or fumigant exposure. The case, which ultimately saw upwards of 
seventy individuals and several of the biggest companies indicted, has never been given the 
academic focus it deserves. In fact, only a few books have given it a passing reference (one 
written by a reporter for the Washington Post who had covered the case as it was unfolding).5  
The case served as a major turning point for the grain industry on a national and global 
scale as it led to the creation of the Federal Grain Inspection Service that would make federal 
oversight part of the day-to-day operations of the elevators. At the center of the case was a 
scheme to defraud international grain customers who were quick to judge the trustworthiness of 
the American grain trade when news of the investigation broke. A loss of such international 
business would really damage the United States’ standing in global trade and hurt the innocent 
bystanders, the farmers, the most severely. The United States Department of Agriculture had just 
moved past its own negative press from huge sales of wheat to the Soviet Union in 1972 when 
more grain controversies arose in 1975. The 1975 scandals more than likely came to light as a 
direct result of the 1972 deal because so much grain was involved in the 1972 sales that it 
revealed shortcomings in the stock of the elevators. The increased, and almost panicked, 
movement of grain coming out of the 1972 sales created pressure within the elevators to keep 
                                               
4 Clara Beach, Unprocessed Oral History Interview conducted December 12, 2017. Property of the T. 
Harry Williams Center for Oral History at Louisiana State University. 
5 Dan Morgan, Merchants of Grain (New York: The Viking Press, 1979). 
Robert Isakson, an FBI agent who worked the case, believes there were close to 100 individuals 
indicted in the case but all press coverage from the time tops out at around seventy-one. See Robert 
Isakson, Unprocessed Oral History Interview conducted March 23, 2018. Property of the T. Harry 
Williams Center for Oral History at Louisiana State University. 
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moving at a breakneck pace that ultimately created a hazardous work environment with a buildup 
of dust and no time for cleaning. For one elevator in Westwego, Louisiana, in 1977, this 
combination of risk and vice, putting business before safety, proved fatal in the worst elevator 
explosion in American history. 
A century of Louisiana grain history vanished in the 1970s, quite literally for the 
Westwego elevator that was first built in 1873, at the hands of these three key incidents: the 1972 
“commodity crisis,” the 1975 “cereal heist,” and the 1977 elevator explosion. Each sparked its 
own changes on the federal level that are still evident in elevators throughout the country and yet 
the specific historical moment that is the Louisiana grain industry in the 1970s has never been 
given the credit it deserves in transforming a global industry. These three events of the 1970s did 
not exist in a bubble as is clear by their relationship to each other and the legacy they have left 
behind. Contemporary accounts prefer to view these events independent of each other, if they are 
given any attention at all, but the reality is they were intimately connected in a ménage a twine 
dating back to the early twentieth century. 
Only in the first half of the twentieth century did scholars begin to look at the grain 
industry with a critical eye and trace its origins and its widespread influence. For Louisiana, this 
meant looking at the role of the grain industry in the various wars of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Dan Morgan’s 1979 book Merchants of Grain may exclude New Orleans 
from its 1880 grain trade routes map, but the plentiful scholarship on the early New Orleans 
grain industry would suggest it played a bigger role in global grain trade at that time than even 
Chicago. Two large volumes of work on agriculture in the antebellum south were produced in 
the 1940s and at least three Master’s theses focused on the topic of rice and grain in nineteenth 
century Louisiana. For unknown reasons, grain scholarship ceased being produced in the 1960s 
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as if that history had stopped being productive. Journalists picked up where these historians left 
off with the publication of books written as the events unfolded. James Trager, an advertising 
writer, released his take on the 1972 Russian sales, Amber Waves of Grain, in 1973, and Dan 
Morgan released what some consider “the first global look at the grain trade” in 1979. Martha 
Hamilton, a researcher for the Agribusiness Accountability Project, contributed the ever-
significant book The Great Grain Robbery & Other Stories in 1972. The significance of this 
book comes primarily from the introduction of the phrase “the Great Grain Robbery” to describe 
the 1972 Soviet sales.  
 From the 1960s to the early 1980s, the grain industry, especially in Louisiana, 
experienced major changes that have not been discussed at length either on their own or within 
the context of the histories developed by those early scholars. Much of the focus of grain history 
writing has been on the Great Plains because they are a primary site of production. Secretary 
Butz's statement from 1972 makes clear, however, that grain production (farming) is only part of 
the picture as trade plays an even bigger role in the overall system. It is the big grain companies 
with their export elevators in key locations along the Gulf Coast that influenced the most change 
for the U.S. grain trade in the shortest amount of time, and at the center of it all stood Louisiana.6 
The history of the Louisiana grain industry simultaneously represents two industries: the 
processing and export of wheat, corn, and soybeans through the port in New Orleans, and the 
cultivation of rice in the Southwest. Coincidentally, the New Orleans export industry grew out of 
the rice industry that once dominated the city when the rice farmers erected their own mills to 
assert more control over the process. Since that first dispute between farmer and miller in the late 
                                               
6 The impact of the American grain trade reaches far beyond economic and agricultural interests. The 
very term “grain elevator” is an American invention as indicated by the Oxford English Dictionary. See 
Brown, American Colossus, 1. 
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nineteenth century, the grain industry has been anything but immune to controversy, scandal, and 
crisis. While grain may seem like a simple commodity, it is actually a revenue generating 
powerhouse, making it highly susceptible to mishandling. Dr. William J. Brown, in what he calls 
“the first in-depth history” of the grain elevator, argues that the first granaries constructed by 
Joseph in Egypt, as described in the Bible, “would inevitably attract vermin and would also be 
obvious targets for bribery, theft, intrigues, and sabotage” because grain was such a highly 
sought-after commodity. Even into modern times the demand for grain and its place in global 
economy is just as high and the attraction of vermin is just as real as it was for Joseph.7 For the 
companies at the center of the system, discretion and secrecy was seen as an even more valuable 
commodity. In 1844, a Boston representative of the British merchant house of Baring Brothers 
wrote to an agent in New Orleans, “Economy is desirable, but secrecy is essential.” This 
statement was in reference to an order for corn to be purchased as relief aid for the famine in 
Ireland. Perhaps secrecy was needed to execute such a sale and shipment in the midst of the 
Mexican-American War. At any rate, the precautions worked as the corn had been safely in 
Cork, Ireland for two weeks before any American competitors knew of the sale.8  
Louisiana's significant role in the U.S. and global grain industry supplies answers for two 
questions posed by Alfred D. Chandler in a 1959 article: "What in the American past has given 
businessmen the opportunity or created the need for them to change what they were doing or the 
way they were doing it?” and “What encouraged them to alter their relations with their working 
force, their customers and competitors, and with the larger American public?"9 While countless 
                                               
7 Brown, American Colossus, 20. 
8 Morgan, Merchants of Grain, x. 
9 Alfred D. Chandler, "The Beginnings of 'Big Business' in American Industry," Business History Review 
(Spring 1959): 2.  
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writers have commented on the shadowy existence of the big grain companies and the grain 
elevators, the historical record shows that what created the need for this industry to change the 
way they were doing things and their relationship with their customers was largely scandals and 
crises of their own creation. The industry's growth in Louisiana was driven by such catalysts for 
change as financial crises of price fluctuation and control, facility crises, safety crises, and 
monetary scandal. 
                                               
See also John Robert Moore, Grist for the Mill: An Entrepreneurial History of Louisiana State Rice 
Milling Company, 1911-1965, River Brand Rice Milling Company, 1946-1965, and Riviana Foods, 1965-
1999 (Lafayette, LA: University of Louisiana at Lafayette, 2000), xi-xii. 
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COMMODITY CRISIS 
We were loading Russian ships for several years. I can remember that, too, because they're usually the biggest 
ships and they always have that hammer and scythe insignia on the smokestack of the ships. . . . Then all of a 
sudden it just kind of quit. I don't know if this is one of the main reasons, but I had heard that . . . the United 
States was . . . subsidizing grain to Russia because the Russians would take the grain and their people were not 
doing so well and then somehow . . . the grain got to the ports of Russia and then it would just sit there and 
there was no infrastructure to get it inland to the people and the grain rotted on the docks. And so eventually 
America just quit doing it. There's probably more to that story, you know, politically, but who knows. 
        -Bart Bauer, Zen-Noh Grain Corporation1 
         The politics of America’s agricultural trade relationship with the Soviet Union is indeed 
complicated, fraught with contradictions, crises, and potential conflicts of interest. The growth of 
Louisiana’s grain industry long relied on export markets like that of the Soviet Union. Political 
decisions throughout the early twentieth century influenced what those markets could be and 
who America’s grain competitors were. For decades, the Soviet Union had been cut off from the 
benefits of American trade as a consequence of the chilling standoff between the two nations. 
Bad harvests in the Soviet Union in the 1960s created internal crises that required them to seek 
grain from outside sources. It was a business as much as a political decision to allow them to 
purchase American grain at that time. Unfortunately, this generated a hunger for American wheat 
and soybeans. By the early 1970s, another bad harvest created a rush on the American grain 
market with the Soviets buying at such unprecedented rates that they threatened to collapse the 
American wheat market. The American grain companies at the center of the Russian purchasing 
deals found themselves in the midst of crisis to meet this incredible demand without 
catastrophically damaging the domestic grain market. The sales agreements between the U.S. 
                                               
1 Bart Bauer, Unprocessed Oral History Interview conducted February 26, 2018. Property of the T. Harry 
Williams Center for Oral History at Louisiana State University. 
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companies and Soviet officials inadvertently revealed the biggest scandal in Louisiana grain 
history when the physical supplies fell far below what was supposedly there on paper. In the 
summer of 1972, Soviet government officials met with executives of a few U.S grain companies 
behind the closed doors of a New York hotel. There had been some indication of activity with 
the Soviet Union but the details remained sparse for a significant amount of time. In mid-July, 
The Southwestern Miller, an industry paper, could only report that “Heavy futures activity and 
ship chartering . . . confirm mammoth, but as yet unconfirmed, sales of wheat and other grains to 
the USSR.” In his first book detailing the intricacies of the deal, investigative reporter James 
Trager indicates that “no consensus was yet apparent on indicated sales total or breakdown, but 
many felt that size would be ‘unprecedented.’” On July 18, The Southwestern Miller published a 
“guarded ‘guess’ that the Soviets might possibly have purchased 100 million bushels of U.S. 
wheat.” Acting on additional rumors of the size of Russia’s demand for wheat, Barney Saunders 
of Cargill had a study prepared of “an apparent maximum of hard red winter wheat available for 
‘extraordinary demand’ such as Russian exports.”2 This study, drawing on published USDA 
data, was finished by the end of July and was brought to the New York meeting between Cargill 
and the Soviets as part of their negotiation arsenal. All of the New York meetings had generated 
a sale of at least $750 million of American wheat, corn, and other grains to the Soviet Union. A 
problem arose only when it was realized that the U.S. companies involved, eager to secure such 
business, “had sold wheat [they] did not own.”3 On reflection, it was clear “each [company] was 
engaged in the delicate process of trying to acquire wheat without disturbing the precarious price 
balance of the market. No company knew how much wheat any other company had sold the 
                                               
2 James Trager, Amber Waves of Grain (New York, Arthur Fields Books, Inc., 1973), 48, 50, 54. 
3 Martha M. Hamilton, The Great American Grain Robbery and Other Stories (Washington, D.C.: 
Agribusiness Accountability Project, 1972), 93. 
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Russians; none knew the total amount of the Soviet purchase. . . . Continental had, in fact, sold at 
least 5.5 million tons, Louis Dreyfus 2.25 million, Cargill 2 million, Cook 900,000, Bunge 
600,000, and Garnac 550,000.” In less than six weeks, Soviet purchases had “exceeded the $1 
billion figure the USDA had projected for a full year’s purchases.”4 Agriculture Secretary Earl 
Butz testified before a subcommittee in September 1972 that “nobody knew then, neither the 
Department of Agriculture nor the trade, just how much the Russians would buy. The export 
traders were not telling each other how much the Soviets were booking with them [and] 
exporters did not tell the Department of Agriculture.”5 
Conditions for the sale manifested from a thawing in the Cold War in which the United 
States “decided to promote trade with Communist countries, and . . . the Soviet Union decided to 
risk dependency on the United States for huge amounts of grain." The circumstances allowing 
the sales to progress as they had (directly under the nose of the USDA) raised many questions of 
scandal and controversy in Washington. Writing in 1990, Joseph G. Gavin, III noted some 
contemporary observers had placed the blame on “a conspiracy between some government 
officials and the ‘Export Trade,’ while others suggested it was “bureaucratic mismanagement.” 
Still others suspected “consumer interests were deliberately traded off to help President Nixon 
                                               
4 Trager, Amber Waves of Grain, 57, 67. 
5 James Trager, The Great Grain Robbery (New York: Ballantine Books, 1975), 37.  
In 1969 and 1970, the CIA had estimated that the Russians would not spend more than $50 
million on imported grain from the U.S. in any given twelve-month period. This estimate and the small 
scale of sales to the USSR in the 1960s led USDA officials to miss numerous red flags as they arose 
throughout 1972. See Joseph G. Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, Russian Buyers and Short Supplies, 1971-
1975 (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc, 1990), 124 n.42. 
In a press conference detailed by The Baltimore Sun on July 9, 1972, the White House said the 
grain sale with the Soviet Union “will be negotiated between the Soviet Union and American private 
commercial exporters,” removing the USDA and other government entities from the negotiations from the 
very beginning. See “U.S. to Sell Soviet Union grain worth $750 million over three years,” The Baltimore 
Sun, July 9, 1972: 3. 
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win reelection or to obtain concession from the Soviet Union on Vietnam.”6 Perhaps it was 
simply a lack of information that the Soviet Union used to their advantage. The most striking 
reality of this unprecedented situation was a severe decline in global grain production amounting 
to a loss of 35 million tons. Poor harvests, particularly in the Soviet Union, left the United States 
as virtually the only country with a significant grain surplus. At the opening of the decade, the 
Soviet Union “had the international liquidity to offset production losses by means of large 
purchases in the international market.” In 1967, similar crop losses had affected the Soviet Union 
and the Indian subcontinent almost equally.7 It is possible, then, that in this new era verging on 
famine, Soviet leaders determined knowledge was their most valuable currency and, therefore, 
shielded their activity on the grain market from the global audience. Of course, purchasing U.S. 
grain in secret would also keep prices low.8           
Initial sales to the Soviet Union began in December 1963 when Continental sold them 
350,000 tons of durum wheat for $78.5 million. In addition, the Soviets agreed to pay $11.5 
million for shipping. An Executive Order carried over from the Kennedy Administration 
requiring half of any Soviet grain sales to be shipped on American vessels resulted in higher 
shipping costs for Continental. Twenty-five million dollars in subsidies were relied upon to 
                                               
6 Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 3, 6-7. 
7 Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 84. 
8 Gavin argues that the USDA would have need three pieces of information in order to even attempt to 
predict the magnitude of the Soviet’s purchases:  
1. Awareness that the Russians had committed to maintaining their livestock herds 
2. Awareness that the Russian grain harvest was in trouble 
3. Awareness of the global-production demand situation - dwindling supplies outside the U.S.  
For the most part, Gavin contends, the decision to purchase U.S. grain was political, not economic, 
making it difficult to estimate what choices would come out of the USSR. It is also claimed, however, 
that by the time the Soviets entered the market with a finalized CCC credit agreement, the USDA had a 
substantial amount of information related to the aforementioned three points but each point was 
discounted for various reasons and it is probable that the USDA did not consider all three in tandem. See 
Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 86-87, 89-90. 
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offset the shipping costs and allow Continental to continue offering wheat at competitive prices.9 
Shortly after these sales were finalized, Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges ruled that “no 
exporting firm could have more than one quarter of the Soviet business.”10 Whether this ruling 
influenced the Soviets to take their subsequent negotiations underground is uncertain, but it 
would offer some explanation for their excessive secrecy.           
President Nixon did away with Kennedy’s Executive Order in June 1971 at the same time 
that he lifted Truman’s embargo on trade with China from 1945 and cancelled the export 
licensing requirement for items sold to the Communist nations. These actions, Assistant 
Secretary of Agriculture Clarence Palmby later claimed, were the “roots of the 1971 Russian 
sales” that threatened to break the grain export system.11 In July 1971, the Williams 
Commission, a governmental entity charged with studying “international trade and investment 
problems facing the United States,” produced a report “in favor of increased trade with the 
Soviet Union.”12 The objective merits of this document certainly come into question when one 
considers that the Williams Commission included representatives from the grain trade who could 
greatly benefit from such increased trade. 
          Continental signed their first contracts with the Soviets in July or October 1971 (available 
documentation offers inconsistent dates for this initial sale). Michel Fribourg, the head of 
Continental was “an idealist,” as Trager sees it, and in the early 1970s had “a burning, selfless 
                                               
9 Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 36-37. 
Export subsidies had been available for rice between 1958 and 1966. As the world price for rice rose, the 
subsidy was eliminated in mid-1967.The subsidy got as high as $2.91 in 1960. See Marshall R. Godwin 
and Lonnie L. Jones, eds., The Southern Rice Industry (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University 
Press, 1970), 27. 
10 Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 67. 
11 Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 39. 
12 Caroline Miles, "US Trade Policy in the 1970s: The Report of the Williams Commission," The World 
Today 28, no. 3 (1972): 102. See also Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 41. 
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desire to cement East-West political relations through increased trade relations.” Since the 
company’s first sales to the Soviet Union in 1963, Fribourg had been on “a first-name basis with 
Moscow’s grain buyers,” paving the way for their grand deal a decade later.13 When negotiations 
began again with Continental in 1972, the leader of the Soviet buying group “led the Continental 
people to believe he was buying grain only from them. He cautioned everyone at the meeting on 
the need for absolute secrecy.”14 
         Cargill joined Continental in the big sales in October 1971 when they sent a group of 
representatives to Moscow. Cargill came out of this meeting with contracts to sell 2 million tons 
of corn and 1.5 million of oats and barley to the USSR.15 For the USDA, this purchase “[w]as a 
momentous breakthrough [and] as a promising opportunity.”16 In 1972, Continental and Cargill 
were the two largest grain companies in the United States, handling close to “50 percent of the 
world’s grain shipments,” according to Business Week.17 At the time of Cargill’s first sale of oats 
and barley, the Commodity Credit Corporation was the only American entity with enough supply 
to meet the Soviet order. Thus, Cargill would need to work with the USDA to purchase from the 
CCC stocks. A bargain was struck in which “the CCC would accept bids from the exporting 
firms for barley and oats at prices below prevailing domestic prices so that the exporters would 
be able to offer these commodities at prices competitive on the work market. In return, the 
traders would undertake to sell certain quantities of U.S. corn at market rates.” Cargill purchased 
oats and barley from the CCC even though they did not yet have contracts with the Soviets for 
                                               
13 Trager, The Great Grain Robbery, 22. 
14 Trager, The Great Grain Robbery, 30-31. 
15 Gavin suggests the total amounts were 2 million tons of corn and 1 million tons of oats and barley split 
between Cargill and Continental at a cost of $150 million. See Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 46-47. 
16 Trager, The Great Grain Robbery, 9. 
17 “The Incredible Empire of Michel Fribourg,” Business Week, March 11, 1972: 84. See also Hamilton, 
The Great American Grain Robbery, 13. 
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the full amount of corn they had promised to sell. Cargill had told the USDA they would sell 12 
million bushels of corn by the end of 1971, yet only half of that corn actually found its way to 
the USSR.18 
          The oats and barley arrangement became problematic when the CCC “was caught short on 
the amount of barley it had agreed to make available to the trading firms at reduced prices,” 
forcing them to look to the open market to fulfill that part of the deal. But the farmers they were 
relying on to sell their barley at cheap rates withheld their crops even when a three cent per 
bushel storage bonus was offered for those farmers if they turned in crops under loan from the 
previous three years ahead of schedule. As Gavin sees it, through the oats and barley 
arrangement, “the Department bent over backwards to help the Export Trade open up the Soviet 
market even if it meant manipulation of non-market policy tools to provide this assistance.” It 
became increasingly clear that the USDA’s desire to accommodate the needs of the grain traders 
“exceeded [their] ability to administer the sales without problems.” The 1971 sales with the 
shortage of oats and barley were only the beginning of a pattern of overextension reliant on grain 
stocks that proved insufficient. 
       On May 25, 1972, Secretary of State William Rogers and Peter Flanigan, Director of the 
Center of International Economic Policy, met with Soviet officials in Moscow to discuss a grain-
credit arrangement. From this discussion and others with National Security Advisor Henry 
Kissinger, the Soviets agreed to a purchase of about $130 million of American grain in 1972, 
paying in all cash.19 At the end of June, the Soviets sent two teams of specialists in grain 
purchasing, maritime shipping, and financing to the U.S. under the auspices of finalizing the 
                                               
18 Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 45, 49. 
19 Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 49, 51, 60, 79. 
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credit arrangement. One team went into secret negotiations with the Department of Commerce 
while the other team went to work with the grain companies.20 The Commerce discussions were 
kept secret “because their content was market-sensitive,” while the company discussion were 
kept secret for obvious reasons of market balance.21 For James Trager, what was surprising about 
the agreement reached at this time as compared to that of 1963, “was that Moscow accepted 
terms it had previously called unacceptable. The Russians agreed to buy U.S. grain worth $750 
million over the next three years, $200 million of it [in] the first year. The USDA’s Commodity 
Credit Corporation agreed to extend $500 million in credit at six and one-eighth percent interest 
any time during the three-year period the Russians chose to buy. The credit was [wholly] 
contingent on the Russians buying grain.”22 
        The 1972 sales were supported by subsidies from the U.S. government that averaged less 
than 30 cents a bushel. It was the astonishing size of the Soviet purchases that created a problem 
for the U.S. taxpayer because they would be paying roughly $132 million for the Russian wheat 
plus an additional $180 million towards grain shipments to other locales. In early July, that only 
amounted to only a few cents per bushel, but by late August 1972, the export subsidy had 
climbed to 38 cents per bushel. Unfortunately, even that was not enough to maintain the target 
price of $1.63 per bushel because wheat was now selling for $2.11 a bushel.23 Martha Hamilton 
points out that in the previous fiscal year, “wheat export payments cost taxpayers $141 million” 
and Cargill had made a hefty sum of $34.8 million from those subsidies.24 On July 3, 1972, 
                                               
20 Gavin does indicate that the presence of two teams was known to U.S. officials yet later testimonies 
suggest Washington was kept in the dark about meetings between Soviet representatives and the grain 
companies. See Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 80, 92. 
21 Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 80. 
22 Trager, The Great Grain Robbery, 20. 
23 Trager, Amber Waves of Grain, 71. 
24 Martha Hamilton, The Great American Grain Robbery, ii. 
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Bernard Steinweg, Senior Vice President of Continental inquired with the USDA if the current 
subsidy policies for wheat would be maintained. Steinweg was assured by Assistant Secretary for 
International Affairs, Carroll Brunthaver, that nothing would change. It is significant to note that 
Brunthaver was new to his position, having held the job for less than two months, and made the 
subsidy decision without consulting other USDA staff members.25 At the time, he believed the 
subsidy was needed to keep the Soviets from taking their business to other markets, not realizing 
these other markets did not have enough stock on hand to pose a real threat.26 Brunthaver’s 
previous position with Cook Industries, a grain exporting company, also raised questions as to 
the true motivations behind his single-handed subsidy decision. 
          In a complex system tied to a target price determined by statistics from the Gulf ports, the 
grain companies could greatly benefit from delaying their application for export subsidies.27 The 
companies asked the USDA for greater flexibility in registering for the subsidies and lobbied for 
the ability to register for them even before any sales contracts were actually signed. As one 
USDA official commented in 1971, “The traders virtually wrote the set of (subsidy) regulations.” 
In the past, subsidy registrations by the grain companies had been used to track export sales. The 
recently modified regulations that the companies were working under in the summer of 1972 
allowed them “to speculate on the subsidy by holding off registration for days of higher prices.” 
This also kept the full scope of sales statistics out of the hands of the USDA. Clarence Palmby 
                                               
25 Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 94. 
26 Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 95. 
27 According to Trager, “The export subsidy was set each day; it was announced in Washington at 3:30pm 
Eastern time, and normally went up or down a penny or two, according to the market, although there was 
nothing automatic about it. If the price at Gulf ports dropped below $1.63 a bushel, no export subsidy was 
required.” See Trager, The Great Grain Robbery, 26-27.  
The Gulf was established as the reference point with the International Grains Agreement of 1967. 
Why the Gulf was chosen for this role is uncertain, but it places the Louisiana grain industry in a 
significant position on the global stage. See Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 55. 
 
 
 
17 
had wanted quarterly reports on Russian shipments to be produced, but that request was not 
made a mandatory policy and was ultimately dropped.28 Shipowners were also eligible for 
subsidies related to these sales but they would only receive their money after a shipment was 
completed and the costs of the trip were fully audited. Still, as close to $9.69 per ton, they could 
expect about $55 million in subsidies. Because shipments were delayed both domestically in 
trying to get the grain to export terminals and internationally through disputes over freight rates, 
the bulk of the shipments and subsidy payments would be made in 1973. It was estimated that 
subsidy payments for all commodity shipments in 1973 would amount to $215 million with less 
than 13 percent of that money being dedicated specifically to the Russian grain movement.          
James Trager reports, “Continental, which sold 191 million bushels of wheat to the 
USSR, applied for subsidies on about 70 million bushels in mid-July, when the subsidy was only 
between 13 and 15 cents a bushel. It applied for subsidy on another 50 million bushels . . . the 
second week in August, when the subsidy was from 31 to 36 cents. When Continental applied for 
subsidy on 71 million bushels in the final week of August, the subsidy was at its all-time high of 
47 cents; but by then, says Continental, the company was registering contracts for wheat on 
which it had paid prices ranging over $2.10 a bushel to cover the sales it had made. Continental 
insists it lost money on those [last] 71 million bushels.”29 By the end of August, when Clarence 
Palmby and James Good of Continental visited Brunthaver about a potential new grain buyer, 
speculated to be the People’s Republic of China, Brunthaver had begun taking steps to end the 
                                               
28 Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 58, 96, 119 n.11. 
29 Trager, Amber Waves of Grain, 85, 72-73.  
It is interesting, given their reliance on the subsidies, that in February 1970, Continental produced 
a produced a print advertisement for The Southwestern Miller in which they proclaimed, “To find the 
most efficient producer of any given product, competition for markets must be free of government 
intervention, subsidies, tariffs, restrictions, licensing and other blocks to free trade.” See Hamilton The 
Great American Grain Robbery, 26. 
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subsidy. The new policy was a two-tier system. For sales made prior to August 24, 1972, the 
grain companies had one week to register them at the flat subsidy rate of forty-seven cents. For 
sales made after August 24, the government subsidy would no longer hold the price at $1.63.30 
The subsidy was fully eliminated of September 22, 1972 when the export price for wheat at the 
Gulf was $2.45 per bushel.31           
Cargill, who made money on their overall sales in 1972, also claimed to have lost money 
on the Soviet deal.32 When the company sold one million tons of wheat (37 million bushels) to 
the Soviets in early July, “it owned less than 7 million bushels [and] was ‘short’ the other 30 
million.” By the end of July, they were still short 20 million bushels but were confident enough 
to sell another one million tons to the Soviets in early August. Cargill only owned the grain that 
was sitting in its elevators waiting to be loaded onto ships for export, meaning the company 
would have to purchase the remaining grain from American farmers or small country elevators. 
Both Cargill and Continental were faced with the dilemma of acquiring enough grain to meet 
their contracts without sparking a purchasing frenzy that would drive up prices. Their delicate 
approach to these purchases was also meant to dissuade government intervention in the sales. 
The purchasing scheme adopted by the two companies is further complicated by the immensely 
intricate futures market: “The standard 5,000-bushel wheat contract [as of 1973] can be bought 
or sold on margin (earnest money) of only 5 to 10 percent. If the price of wheat to be delivered in 
                                               
30 Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 100, 101.  
The new system was not immune to abuses as its hasty implementation “was an open invitation 
for firms to make registrations for subsidies on sales that had not yet been made.” See Gavin, III, U.S. 
Grain Exports, 102.  
An Export Marketing Services audit from September 14, 1972, revealed that “subsidy registration 
for 5,689,631 bushels with subsidy value of $2,739,915 were invalid . . . and two companies refunded 
payments already received.” See Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 129 n.58. 
31 Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 106. 
32 Their losses were reported to be over $600,000.  See Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 110. 
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March, May, July, September, or December goes up, the trader [i.e. Cargill or Continental] who 
has agreed to deliver wheat in that particular month (that is, sold short) must put up the 
difference between his original contract price and the actual market price; a 5 to 10 percent price 
rise can wipe out his stake – his broker will liquidate his contract unless he puts up more margin. 
If the price of wheat goes down, the trader who has agreed to accept delivery in a given month 
(bought long, that is) still has a commitment to pay the price in his original contract.”33 
Cargill was certainly no stranger to the significance of profits and losses to their image 
with the federal government. Hamilton recounts, “In December 1971, the Eighth U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals upheld government arguments that Cargill violated the Commodity Exchange 
Act in trading on the Chicago Board of Trade. The charge was manipulating the market price of 
wheat futures through a ‘squeeze’ (a dominant position in the futures market). Cargill’s defense 
was that it made money on the deal. To be guilty of manipulation under that act, a trader must 
commit an ‘uneconomic’ act, Cargill said. The company also contended that ‘squeezes’ weren’t 
prohibited.”34 A similar charge had been brought against Cargill in September 1937 when the 
company was suspected of attempting to corner the corn futures market on the Chicago Board of 
Trade. Ultimately, the courts and the Board of Trade ruled against the company, and it was 
“assessed a number of severe financial and trading penalties.” The company’s CEO, John 
MacMillan, Jr., retaliated by pulling Cargill out of the Board of Trade and using outside agents 
to work the market for several years.35          
                                               
33 Trager, Amber Waves of Grain, 73, 37. 
34 “Cargill Appeal Denied on Charge of Juggling Wheat Future Prices,” Wall Street Journal, December 
13, 1971. See also Hamilton, The Great American Grain Robbery, 22. 
35 Wayne G. Broehl, Jr., Cargill: Trading the World’s Grain (Hanover, NH: University Press of New 
England, 1992), xviii. Wayne G. Broehl, Jr., Cargill: From Commodities to Customers (Lebanon, NH: 
University Press of New England, 2008), 5.  
In 1978, ADM pleaded no contest to charges of fixing prices on contracts in the Food for Peace 
program. Repeatedly, ADM found itself on the receiving end of complaints linked to price fixing. This 
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On September 18, 1972, “The CEA [Commodity Exchange Authority], the USDA 
agency responsible for regulating the futures markets” opened a formal investigation into 
reported “inaccuracies in the mandatory grain trade reports about the size of open cash and 
futures positions.”36 These inaccuracies pertained largely to the size of the grain companies’ 
outstanding sales commitments. The CEA had additional problems with trading speculation and 
the grain companies because the CEA “had largely relied on the professional traders to police 
themselves. Regulation, they said, actually declined in the years from 1965 to 1972, a period in 
which the volume of commodity trading zoomed from $65 billion a year to more than $200 
billion.” Trager argues that “a group of grain traders was [also] alleged to have rigged wheat 
futures on the Kansas City Board of Trade in 1972. . . in order to drive up the export subsidy.” 
He notes, “The CEA referred the charges to the Kansas City Board itself, and the board’s 
investigation committees, made up of influential board members, including some Continental 
Grain Company officials, declared there was ‘no basis for complaint.’"37 It was also revealed that 
several of the grain companies “were using questionable measures to keep the size of the 
[overall] Soviet purchases secret to prevent the market from exploding until they had bought 
enough to meet their contractual obligations.”38 As Trager notes, these “grossly inaccurate” 
reports and other charges “arising out of the rush of activity in the grain market following the 
                                               
ultimately led to a large FBI investigation into the company’s activities in the late 1990s. See Kurt 
Eichenwald, The Informant: A True Story (New York: Broadway Books, 2000), 27. 
36 Trager, The Great Grain Robbery, 199. Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 105. 
37 Trager, The Great Grain Robbery, 99. 
In 1991, ADM officials “disclosed that they had uncovered more than $6 million in trading losses 
dating back years . . . Fraudulent trading records were [later] discovered, and the total losses eventually 
exceeded more than $14 million.” See Eichenwald, The Informant, 27. 
38 Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 134 n.66. 
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Russian wheat deals, led in 1974 to new federal legislation to overhaul the nation’s commodity 
exchange law.”39  
In an October 21, 1974 memorandum to the President from Ken Cole, it was noted the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, H.R. 13113 “provides needed reform to 
the nation’s commodity futures markets. These markets have become increasingly volatile due to 
improper activities by some merchants.”40 H.R. 13113 removed the responsibility of the 
Commodity Exchange Authority from the USDA and created the independent Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission. Under the USDA, the CEA was responsible for “administering the 
Commodity Exchange act of 1922,” wherein their role was “to protect the hedging and price 
functions of the Nation’s commodity futures markets with respect to 18 specific agricultural 
commodities,” including wheat, soybeans, and rice. As trade relations with the Soviet Union 
began to broaden in the 1960s and early 1970s, concerns emerged over the narrowness of Federal 
regulation under the CEA system. The strain placed on the grain market in the early 1970s as a 
result of the uneven handling of the Russian sales represented “one of the first manifestations of 
the increasing vulnerability of domestic economies to global economic developments.”41 There 
had been “nothing in the [1972 credit agreement with the Soviets] setting maximum tonnages of 
any commodity, because it did not occur to the American delegation that the Russians could ever 
buy too much.”42 In 1974, Washington officials sought to remedy these commodity issues by 
establishing “a full time, independent regulatory commission . . . with five Commissioners . . . 
                                               
39 Trager, The Great Grain Robbery, 100. 
40 Ken Cole, “Enrolled Bill: Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, H.R. 13113,” October 
21, 1974, Box 10, folder “10/23/74 HR13113 Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 (1)” 
of the White House Records Office: Legislation Case Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. 
41 Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, viii. 
42 Joseph Albright, “The Full Story of How America Got Burned and the Russians Got Bread,” New York 
Times, November 25, 1973: 36. 
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appointed by the President.” This new regulatory body would “significantly enlarge the 
jurisdiction of the government’s regulation . . . to include all future trading including lumber and 
metals.”43 President Gerald Ford signed the bill into law only two days after Cole’s first 
memorandum was delivered.44  
         Regardless of the monetary (and later political) implications of the game of wheat 
exchange undertaken in 1972, the real crisis arose from the short supply Cargill, Continental, and 
the other companies encountered, raising questions of U.S. supplies that existed on paper in the 
elevators but failed to materialize. This hit hardest at the smallest country elevators where some 
operators “who had not bought wheat futures to hedge their sales to exporters were forced into 
bankruptcy and thus reneged on contracts they had made with exporters.” In addition, “foreign 
buyers had ordered twice as much of the remaining 1972 soybean crop as the Agriculture 
Department considered ‘available for export,’ [meaning] the exporters had sold more soybeans 
than there were to sell. And even before the first bushel of the new wheat crop was harvested, 
nearly 38 percent of that crop - 18 million tons - had been sold for export, including 2.5 million 
to mainland China.”45 Some dock workers, especially in the Gulf, tried to hinder the delivery of 
such grain by boycotting the loading of ships bound for the Soviet Union, but grain still made its 
way to the contested Communist ports. They understood that the Gulf stood in the eye of the 
wheat storm and diminishing grain stocks at home to supply these foreign buyers would only 
spike prices for basic foodstuffs like milk and beef. In preventing grain from leaving the Gulf 
                                               
43 “Enrolled Bill H.R. 13113 - Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974,” October 17, 1974, 
Box 10, folder “10/23/74 HR13113 Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 (1)” of the 
White House Records Office: Legislation Case Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. 
44 Public Law 93-463. 
45 Trager, The Great Grain Robbery, 77, 201. 
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they could perhaps buy time for the federal government to intervene and change the nature of the 
sales to keep repercussions for the American taxpayer to a minimum.  
Continental’s 1963 sales had been severely challenged by a strike at East Coast and Gulf 
ports. This strike was in response to the Kennedy Administration agreement that grain shipments 
should be sent equally in Soviet and U.S. ships. The U.S. shipping industry publicly stated they 
“did not have enough bottoms to carry half of a four and one-eighth million-ton grain order, [yet] 
the powerful International Longshoreman’s Association (ILA) flatly refused to load Russian 
vessels unless American ships were allotted the same amount of cargo the Russians got.” The 
strike finally ended in late February 1964, but there is a belief that if members of Congress, the 
shipping industry, and these unions had been more cooperative from the outset, the grain sales to 
the Soviet Union at that time could have been much greater in scale. By the time the strike came 
to an end, “U.S. wheat [was selling] at $2.30 a bushel [and] required a 55-cent export subsidy . . . 
to enable Continental . . . to sell that wheat to the Russians at $1.75 a bushel, which was the 
world price at the time.” In response to the strike, President Nixon, “acting by authority granted 
him under the Export Control Act . . . scrapped an old rule that required special export licenses 
for anything sold to the Soviet Union . . . [O]nly a general export license [would be] needed 
[and] exports did not have to be reported until after shipment [was] made.” When the next big 
sale was finalized in November 1971, various maritime unions, including the ILA, “waived their 
demand that American ships be allotted the same amount of cargo as Russian ships” because any 
disruptive behavior on their part would only guarantee them “50 percent of nothing.” Strikes tied 
to “work-rule” disputes still blocked shipments from East and Gulf ports in 1971, but grain was 
able to leave through the Great Lakes ports.46 In October 1972, a shipment agreement had been 
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made with the maritime unions allocating one-third of the grain cargo to be shipped on U.S. 
vessels, one-third in Soviet vessels, and one-third in other vessels. Disputes over shipping rates 
delayed the shipments from leaving the U.S., with Russian interests claiming the world market 
rate was $7.50 a ton while the Americans believed it was closer to $10.35. The first American 
ship arrived at the port of Odessa on December 20, 1972, although some grain had arrived earlier 
on third party ships.47 The delivery logistics tied to the July 1972 contracts bleed into sales 
procured in the following years, making it possible that the final shipments were not delivered 
until 1975 when a new trade agreement was finalized between the United States and the Soviet 
Union.48  
          The massive 1972 deal was made entirely in secret between representatives of the Soviet 
government and executives of the U.S. grain companies. The highly competitive nature of the 
grain trade itself promoted such secret negotiations and the Soviets took advantage of that fact. 
At the same time, numerous USDA officials resigned from their posts to take jobs with the big 
grain companies. Clarence Palmby, who was Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for Foreign 
Trade and Commodity Programs under President Nixon and served in that role until 1973, left 
that job to become corporate vice president for marketing, planning and development at 
Continental, the very company that had initiated grain sales to the Soviet Union in 1963.49 
                                               
47 Trager, Amber Waves of Grain, 81, 83. 
48 Grain sold in 1975 was likely still making its way through the Gulf when Bart Bauer began working at 
the Zen-Noh elevator in 1982. 
Palmby’s timing for his departure is a bit suspect as it came after the CCC credit arrangement was 
finalized in Moscow but prior to the first meetings between the Soviets and Continental. Considering 
Continental was the first company the Soviets approached, did Palmby’s transition into his new role with 
the company ensure that they benefitted from the opening of Soviet purchases? Continental had offered 
Palmby a job in March prior to his trip to Moscow, raising further suspicions of conflict-of-interest 
throughout the progression of the Russian deal. See Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 94, 132 n.62. 
Richard Nixon, in an interview for ABC News, commented that he thought the sale of 150 
million bushels of wheat to the USSR in 1963 would “turn out to be the major foreign policy mistake of 
[the Kennedy] administration, even more serious than fouling up the Bay of Pigs.” In his view, the U.S. 
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Palmby had worked for the U.S. Feed Grains Council prior to joining Clifford M. Hardin’s 
USDA team.50 One president of the Council during Palmby’s tenure was Samuel Sabin, a vice 
president of Continental.51 As head of the Feed Grains Council, Palmby concluded “the solution 
to the farmer’s income problem was to eliminate production restraints and to increase the volume 
of U.S. grain exports.”52  
           Hardin had joined the USDA after serving as the Dean of Agriculture at the University of 
Nebraska and was succeeded by Earl Butz in 1971. Clarence Palmby was succeeded by Carroll 
Brunthaver in 1973. Butz had come to the USDA from Ralston Purina (later owned by Cargill) 
and Brunthaver had gotten his start at Cook Industries.53 Further complicating the 
interconnectedness of the USDA and the grain trade, Martha Hamilton points out that two former 
“grain trade officers” had moved over to the USDA and “one of the four firms [Bunge had] 
recently picked up a fifth USDA official, the Export Marketing Services’ retiring chief 
administrator,” Clifford Pulvermacher.54  In the midst of all this staff changeover, “Senator 
George McGovern . . . had come out with a charge that the ‘cozy’ relationship between the 
USDA and companies such as Continental, as illustrated by the job-jumping of men like 
                                               
was subsidizing Khrushchev “in a time when he’s in deep economic trouble. It pulls him out of a very 
great hole and allows him to divert the Russian economy into space and military activities that he 
otherwise would have had to keep in agriculture.” See Trager, The Great Grain Robbery, 16.  
Ironically, the Russian grain sales that took place during Nixon’s administration were considered his 
biggest economic policy gaffe.  
See Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 66. 
50 The U.S. Feed Grains Council is a nonprofit industry organization that sponsored projects in the 1970s 
to increase livestock and poultry production in foreign countries that would in turn boost export levels of 
U.S. grains. The Council’s current website notes they “develop export markets for U.S. barley, corn, and 
sorghum.” At the heart of their past and present missions lie the interests of the grain trade. See Gavin, 
III, U.S. Grain Exports, 65. See also U.S. Grains Council, “About the Council,” 2019, 
https://grains.org/about/about-the-council/. 
51 Hamilton, The Great American Grain Robbery, 164. 
52 Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 32. 
53 Trager, The Great Grain Robbery, 28. 
54 Hamilton, The Great American Grain Robbery, 59. Wayne G. Broehl, Jr. Cargill: Going Global 
(Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1998), 193-194. 
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Clarence Palmby, had somehow enabled the export companies to reap windfall profits” from the 
Soviet sales. Trager maintains “no scandal was ever substantiated [and] a Justice Department 
investigation found no criminal wrongdoing on the part either of a government employee, past or 
present, or of a grain company executive.”55 
         Palmby’s testimony before the House Subcommittee on Livestock and Grains in September 
1972 led many congressmen to believe that he had “acted improperly” in his role with the 
USDA. The Justice Department and the FBI both looked into conflict of interest charges against 
Palmby given that he had helped facilitate these large sales for Continental, only to join their 
forces shortly thereafter. Two items cited by Hamilton in reference to this case state a federal 
conflict of interest statue existed that “prohibits any former officer of an executive agency from 
acting as an agent for anyone other than the United States in connection with any contract or 
other particular matter involving specific parties in which the United States has substantial 
interest.” Additionally, these documents reference USDA rules “which bar a former employee 
for one year after his service with the department has ended from representing anyone in 
connection with any such matter within the boundaries of his former official responsibility.”56 
Given this evidence, how could Palmby not be guilty of improper conduct, or even abuse of his 
position within the USDA? Yet, the FBI found no evidence to support such charges. There was 
still enough suspicion in the air outside Washington, however, for numerous farmers to file 
lawsuits against Palmby, the USDA, and some of the big grain companies.57 
                                               
55 Trager, The Great Grain Robbery, 103-104. 
56 18 U.S.C. § 207 (a). Sec. 7 C.F.S. § 0.735-14. See Hamilton, The Great American Grain Robbery, 67-
68. 
57 Trager, The Great Grain Robbery, 27-28. 
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          The notoriety of what later became known as “The Great Grain Robbery” was the very 
scandal believed to be at its core. Had the Russians robbed the United States? Had the USDA 
been in cahoots with the grain companies to generate larger profits for them? Were there ulterior 
motives for the Soviet purchases such as keeping U.S. grains out of the hands of the Chinese? 
What the sales ultimately did was trigger a “trade boom that caused earnings and net worth in the 
export Trade to double and triple in the following two years.”58 Cook Industries reported record 
earnings in 1974 of $46, 226,000 as a result of this trade boom. Cook was the only grain 
company required by law to publicly report its financial activities because it was the only 
publicly held company.59 It is widely acknowledged that “the grain trade leadership is a close-
mouthed bunch. . . . With fewer than 500 stockholders and no desire to sell stocks publicly, the 
companies need not report to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. SEC requirements . 
. . provide for reporting only basic corporate financial data and information on types of 
diversification and areas of growth. Cargill, Continental, Bunge, and Dreyfus [did] not have to 
reveal even this much.”60 The men at the helm of these companies, according to Trager, “were 
allowed, in effect, to determine U.S. foreign and economic policy.”61 By the time all was said 
and done, Continental, Cook, and Cargill were responsible for the majority of the trade with the 
Soviet Union, including increased movement of soybeans beginning in late 1972.62 
          In 1973, as Russian purchases showed no signs of slowing down, President Nixon ordered 
a temporary embargo on the export of soybeans as supplies of the crop began to shrink. The 
soybean embargo primarily affected Eastern European nations. The following year, President 
                                               
58 Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 110. 
59 “The Incredible Empire of Michel Fribourg,” 84. See Hamilton, The Great American Grain Robbery, 
13.  
60 Hamilton, The Great American Grain Robbery, 42-43. 
61 Trager, The Great Grain Robbery. 199. 
62 Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 157. 
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Ford implemented “voluntary” controls on grain exports destined for the Soviet Union. A 1974 
deal between the Soviets and the U.S. grain companies to purchase more than $500 million of 
corn and wheat was ultimately cancelled when Agriculture Secretary Earl Butz admitted he “had 
not been ‘firm enough’ in warning Russian officials and U.S. grain company executives against 
such large sales.” Butz introduced a new monitoring system that would require the USDA to 
“approve all large [grain] sales to foreign buyers”63 in an attempt to prevent a repeat of the 1972 
sales and the disruption they had created in the U.S. market. The monitoring system was also 
intended to answer to Butz’s critics who had been calling for his resignation. As with the 1972 
sales, the decision coming out of the White House was heavily influenced by the circumstances 
of an upcoming election. George Anthan of the Des Moines Register commented in a 1974 
article, the Ford administration did not want to “saddle Republican candidates with another 
political liability just weeks before the November 5 election.” According to Representative 
Wiley Mayne, the U.S. government was “supposed to have some right to inspect [the Russian] 
harvests . . . [The Soviets] reneged on that . . . and followed it up with the deliberate concealment 
of their intentions at the same time the Japanese and Europeans were telling us approximately 
what their needs are going to be.” At the same time, Representative Neal Smith accused Butz of 
being “unduly influenced by the big grain companies” and “incapable of looking out for the 
public interest.”64 The 1973 embargo on soybean exports had left a bad taste in the mouths of 
some and Representative William Scherle asked, “Next year, when we have grain running out of 
our ears, who are we going to sell it to [if we are seen as unreliable]?”65 All grain sales to the 
                                               
63 Clark Mollenhoff, “Butz Admits He Erred in Grain Deal,” The Des Moines Register, October 8, 1974: 
1.  
This deal had been brokered with Continental and Cook. 
64 George Anthan, “USDA Officials: Sale ‘Lost’,” The Des Moines Register, October 8, 1974: 4. 
65 George Anthan, “USDA Officials: Sale ‘Lost’,” The Des Moines Register, October 8, 1974: 4. 
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Soviet Union were suspended in early 1975 only to be lifted that October with the signing of a 
“five-year agreement to regularize Russian grain purchases in the U.S. market.” In the late 
1980s, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a new five-year agreement for grain sales 
that was a virtual replication of the deal arranged in 1975 that had been designed to alleviate the 
grain shortfalls from the original sales of 1972.66 The first sale in this new arrangement was two 
million tons of wheat by Cook Industries and 1.2 million by Cargill in July 1975.67  
For some, “the most striking and unique characteristic of the grain sale episodes is how 
intensely consumer interests were engaged, directly or indirectly, in the formulation of trade 
policy.”68 The realization that the big grain companies had essentially been driving U.S. foreign 
and economic policy up to this point led to stronger protest from consumers who were forced to 
pay higher prices at the grocery store as a direct result of the Russian sales. In response, the U.S. 
government revised their policies on grain exports and took steps to regulate domestic prices. 
The new system required grain sales “in excess of 100,000 metric tons” to be made public 
knowledge by 3:30pm on the next business day after the sale was finalized.69  
The 1972 sales had long lasting effects that were primarily felt by New Orleans and the 
Gulf ports and grain shipments from interior origination points bottlenecked or elevators 
struggled to find enough railcars to move the amount of grain in question.70 It took several 
months to a year for Continental and Cargill’s initial contracts to be completely fulfilled.71 A 
                                               
66 Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, 5, ix. 
67 “Corn Delivery to Begin in October,” The Des Moines Register, July 22, 1975: 4. 
68 Gavin, III, U.S. Grain Exports, xi. 
69 “Tighter Grain Sales Reports Culled from Commodity Bill,” The Town Talk, August 20, 1978: 47. 
70 Trager, Amber Waves of Grain, 185.  
According to the traffic manager of a country elevator group, trying to coordinate such large 
movement the aftermath of the sales was “the worst mess I’ve seen in the twenty years I’ve been in this 
business. We’re grabbing anything we can get our hands on – coal cars, baggage cars, anything that will 
hold a bushel of grain.”  
71 Trager, Amber Waves of Grain, 83. 
 
 
 
30 
1978 proposed Senate bill had similar requirements to the policy changes from 1972, mainly that 
the name of the firm that made the sale and the price of the grain involved be released. 
Representative Neal Smith argued the system introduced by the USDA in 1972 had a “large 
loophole because foreign grain purchases made from foreign affiliates of American companies 
are not reported to the Agriculture Department” making the additional disclosure requirements a 
necessity in preventing another grain scandal.72 
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SCANDAL ON THE DOCKS 
 Private inspection was pretty much entrenched in the export industry for a lot of years. And then they had  
 some governmental changes that occurred in the late seventies that required the Federal Grain Inspection  
 Service to supervise at the beginning. And then, typically, in a two or three-year period, they took over all  
 exported grain in the country. So they had to be there and it kind of minimized the role of the inspection  
 companies, private inspection companies. 
    -Ricky Creed, Health and Safety Manager, Zen-Noh Grain Corporation1 
         The 1972 sales to the Soviet Union, while greatly increasing farm income and opening 
previously frozen trade relations, incidentally exposed the largest scandal in U.S. grain history: 
private inspectors succumbing to bribes and stealing grain. As Louisiana elevators processed 
more grain than anywhere else in the United States, suspicions emerged that somehow grain was 
being stolen on the New Orleans.2 The FBI began investigating such information, thinking 
physical theft was at the heart of the issue. However, their investigation quickly revealed that it 
was bigger than simply “stealing bags of grain” as a key witness, dubbed “the crawfish man,” 
revealed patterns of widespread misgrading of grain, fraudulent grain sales, and bribery in 
elevators in New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Texas. Much of the scandal originated with grain 
inspection, a process that was privatized in the late 1920s. With no oversight, the inspectors 
could easily manipulate scales and falsify documents to reflect higher receipts than actually 
                                               
1 Ricky Creed, Unprocessed Oral History Interview conducted April 5, 2018. Property of the T. Harry 
Williams Center for Oral History at Louisiana State University. 
2 “Baton Rouge grain probe to be resumed,” The Times, January 29, 1978: 8. 
It was not uncommon for people to steal international cargo at the Port because it was always so 
busy. After September 11, 2001, security at the Port and the elevators became much tighter as a national 
security measure, but it was pretty lax up until that point. Bart Bauer even contends that some ships that 
had been loaded at the Zen-Noh grain elevator in Convent, Louisiana, were captured pirates en route to 
their overseas customer. See Robert Isakson, Unprocessed Oral History Interview Conducted March 23, 
2018. Property of the T. Harry Williams Center for Oral History at Louisiana State University. See also 
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Williams Center for Oral History at Louisiana State University. 
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existed. This became a breaking point in 1972 when stock amounts on paper did not match stock 
amounts in the elevators. Or, as was the case with Cook Industries, the elevators somehow 
exported more grain than they received.3 In 1976, the U.S. government, responding to the 
scandal and the precariousness of the grain trade’s reputation, created a reorganized Federal 
Grain Inspection Service within the USDA. New FGIS inspectors were tasked with “watch[ing] 
the flow of grain in and out of the facilit[ies]; ”4 and since the Gulf coast was not the only home 
to terminal grain elevators, the FGIS became a body of national regulation, overseeing the 
grading and inspection of the nation’s grain as outlined by the Grain Standards Act.5 The primary 
effect of the new FGIS was the removal of inspection duties from private hands, but the presence 
of federal personnel working alongside elevator inspectors was nothing new.  
                                               
3 USDA records showed the Cook elevator in New Orleans had exported 18.6 million bushels more than 
it had received from 1971-1973. See James Risser, “Errors Seen in Records of Shipments,” The Des 
Moines Register, June 21, 1975: 1. 
4 “5 Die in Silo Blast,” The Town Talk, December 22, 1977: 1. 
5 The first bill advocating for federal standards and inspection of grain was introduced in 1890 during the 
first session of the 51st Congress. “Strong opposition from groups against any federal involvement in the 
grain industry” prevented this bill from being passed. A renewed version of the bill calling for a “uniform 
standard of classification and grading” of various grain was passed by the Senate in 1892 but denied by 
the House. In 1906, the Division of Grain Standardization was organized. The passage of the United 
States Grain Standards Act, Public Law No. 190, in 1916 “provided for federal enforcement of uniform 
[grading] standards. See Lowell D. Hill, Grain Grades and Standards: Historical Issues Shaping the 
Future (Urbana and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 60, 66, 88.  
In addition to changing how the grain industry conducts business and is policed, the Heist 
investigation changed how the FBI approached cases. According to Robert Isakson, the FBI had 
previously been a statistics-driven regime in which quantity overpowered quality, meaning having more 
car theft arrests was preferable to having one convicted politician. After the successful returns of the Heist 
investigation, the mindset shifted to privilege quality over quantity. The focus became things like fraud, 
embezzlement, espionage, and extortion; so-called “white-collar” crimes. They were “getting major 
corporations, major people, politicians,” where they previously would not have taken the time to see such 
an investigation through because it takes time to tackle these larger targets and they “had to make those 
statistics.” See Robert Isakson, Unprocessed Oral History Interview Conducted March 23, 2018. Property 
of the T. Harry Williams Center for Oral History at Louisiana State University.  
Kevin McKean suggests this shift began two years earlier in 1973 when New Orleans and three 
other cities were chosen for the “Quality vs. Quantity” pilot program. See Kevin McKean, “FBI in N.O. 
Has Eye on White Collar Crime,” The Town Talk, October 20, 1977: 24. 
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The Decatur Herald stated in a 1917 article, “W. D. Smith left Decatur Wednesday for 
New Orleans, where he will take a position in the federal grain inspection service as a sampler, 
whose duties are quit[e] similar to the duty of a grain inspector under the usages of the Illinois 
inspection bureau.”6 In the 1930s, it was also noted in the press that “all weighing [was] done by 
licensed weighers” who were likely working for private inspection companies. These weighers 
issued “warehouse receipts . . . based on these weights” they recorded for each shipment of 
grain; something, it turns out, that was easy to manipulate.7  
What has become labeled the Cereal Heist of 19758 was borne out of and intimately 
connected to the Great Grain Robbery of 1972. The Times Picayune argued that “some 
Agriculture Department officials succumbed to industry pressure in the past and falsely upgraded 
low quality grain for sale to foreign countries”9 and The Advocate expressly stated, “the 
corruption [of 1975] flowed from the rising stakes in the grain export trade since 1972, when 
Soviet purchases and a surge in foreign demand caused exports to boom.”10 Additionally, as 
Wayne G. Broehl, Jr. indicates, the high volume of grain being moved as a result of  the Soviet 
sales encouraged tendencies of short changing and corner cutting within the elevators: “With the 
costs very high to ocean ships for demurrage while waiting to load . . . and with all sorts of 
shipping being called upon to load grain, the temptation to short-circuit the inspection procedure 
                                               
6 “Goes to New Orleans,” The Decatur Herald, February 22, 1917: 6. 
7 Times-Picayune, June 6, 1937. 
8 Journalists of the time were slightly unoriginal when they dubbed it the “Great Grain Scandal.” As it 
would seem that the details of the 1975 investigation point more towards literal theft than the 1972 sales, 
I have chosen to rebrand the investigation as the Cereal Heist.  
See, for example, Bill Crider, “Gallinghouse denies patronage system,” Pampa Daily News, 
October 20, 1977: 21. Bill Crider, “He’s after ‘public scoundrels’,” The Times, October 2, 1977: 19. Bill 
Crider, “Stalks the Public Wrong-Doers,” The Evening Times, September 27, 1977: 5. Bill Crider, 
“Gallinghouse Exception to Patronage Rule,” The Town Talk, September 27, 1977: 3. 
9Don Kendall, “Grain Claims Under Probe,” Times-Picayune, September 11, 1975: 3. 
10 Dan Morgan, “Grain Scandal: Word No Longer Good as Bond,” Advocate, November 29, 1975: 25. 
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was always present - and succumbed to in a number of instances.”11 The stage was set for 
scandal (even though signs of it had been present for decades). According to historian Lowell D. 
Hill, “The USDA quietly initiated investigations into grain-grading practices in the United 
States” in 1901 in response to “complaints of foreign buyers about the quality of U.S. grain.” 
Their investigation lasted until 1906 and was done without any authority from Congress. Even in 
this early investigation, they found that “the grain trade lacked uniformity in grading.” Many of 
the inspectors were simply grading the grain based on “visual impressions of its quality, 
unsupported by an tests or numerical values.” Charges of “eye balling” would resurface 
throughout the 1975 case.12  
 When Ricky Creed began his career as a private inspector with South Louisiana Grain 
Inspection and Weighing in the late 1970s, he joined an industry created by the Grain Standards 
Act of 1916. Under this Act, the Agricultural Marketing Service “designate[d] official inspection 
agencies to inspect grain in the United States. . . . The inspection agencies, which [could] be 
operated by state governments, local boards of trade, or private individuals, [were] responsible 
for hiring and training the samplers, technicians, and inspectors who [were] licensed by USDA to 
do the actual inspection.”13 No particular education was required for samplers, but they did have 
to pass a USDA written and practical exam within a month of being hired in order to obtain a 
USDA license. Samplers earned between $10,000 and $12,000 annually and their income was 
primarily based on how efficiently the grain companies loaded ships.14  
                                               
11 Wayne G. Broehl, Jr., Cargill: Going Global (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1998), 
268. 
12 Lowell D. Hill, Grain Grades and Standards: Historical Issues Shaping the Future (Urbana and 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 65-66. 
13 “USDA Suspends Inspection, Weighing License of Indicted Officials,” Daily World, August 26, 1975: 
7. 
14 “Probe May Slow Export of Grain,” Morning Advocate, May 28, 1975: 2.  Anita Schrodt, “Grain 
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The New Orleans Public Grain Elevator, which began operations on February 1, 1917, 
utilized employees of the Board of Trade Grain Department as grain inspectors until January 1, 
1929. The elevator’s inspection arrangement with the Board of Trade was set to expire at the end 
of December 1928 so the Board elected to permit the duties of grain inspection to henceforth be 
“performed directly by the operating force of the elevator.” It was estimated such a shift to 
privatized inspection would attract a considerable amount of additional grain movement to the 
city, allowing New Orleans to emerge as one of the most profitable ports in the country.15 The 
new policy also created an environment that fed the general “existence of secrecy” that the grain 
industry so enjoyed by internalizing all aspects of grain handling. According to the FBI’s key 
witness, theft within the New Orleans elevators began at this moment of privatization and as new 
generations of employees entered the elevators, they saw that this was the way things were done: 
“My daddy did it. My grandfather did it. They’ve been doing it for seventy-five years. . . . I’m 
brought up the way this is how we do it. This is the kind of money you make.”16  
 Beginning as early as 1903, members of the grain trade in New Orleans were finding 
ways to bend established rules in their favor. Rail lines to the Gulf, in an agreement with those 
running to the Atlantic ports, were to charge two cents per 100 pounds lower from the Missouri 
River than the established rate to the Atlantic seaboard. When business to the Gulf did not live 
up to the expectations of the rail operators, they violated this agreement and began charging rates 
far below what had been agreed to. They “promised to be good” numerous times but consistently 
reverted to violating the terms of the agreement. Because the Eastern rail lines refused to play 
                                               
15 “Weighing Charges Eliminated at Public Grain Elevator,” The American Elevator and Grain Trade 
XLVII, No. 7 (January 15, 1929): 419. 
16 Robert Isakson, Unprocessed Oral History Interview conducted March 24, 2018. Property of the T. 
Harry Williams Center for Oral History at Louisiana State University. 
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along and reduce their rates to correspond to the Gulf reductions, the Atlantic ports began losing 
business to their Gulf competitors.17 Cheap rates for rail transport and lower inspection costs 
combined to make the Gulf an attractive site for merchants with grain to sell (and for customers 
looking to purchase grain).  
 By the early twentieth century, one of the busiest elevators in Louisiana was the 
Weswego facility operated by the Texas and Pacific Railroad. This grain terminal included “two 
grain elevators, one of 1,000,000 bushels’ and one of 400,000 bushels’ capacity. From these 
houses three belt conveyors extend[ed] to the river, which [could] deliver 75,000 bushels of grain 
per hour into three ships loading simultaneously.”18 The elevator had been setting export records 
since its construction in 1892 and had become a sprawling complex “occupying more than thirty 
city blocks, in the heart of the business district” by 1904.19 A good amount of the grain making 
its way to the Westwego facility likely came down the Mississippi River from Chicago and its 
surrounding markets. In his 1921 report on the Industrial Canal, Thomas Ewing Dabney notes 
that with new canal routes, water shipment from Chicago traveled an identical distance to New 
Orleans or New York: 912 miles.20 Lower rail rates to New Orleans probably worked to attract 
more business from Chicago farmers and merchants. For decades, the shipping process in 
Chicago had privileged individual farms with grain being transported in sacks that could easily 
identify the grain’s origin point. According to historian William Cronon, this prevented grain 
mixing while ensuring “nothing adulterated the characteristic weight, bulk, cleanliness, purity, 
                                               
17 “New Orleans Takes the Lead,” The Times-Democrat, September 25, 1903: 1. 
18 “Geo. W. Roth,” The American Elevator and Grain Trade XX, No. 9 (March 15, 1902): 410. 
19 Texas and Pacific Railway Advertisement in The Washington Herald, January 26, 1913: 4-5. 
20 Thomas Ewing Dabney, The Industrial Canal and Inner Harbor of New Orleans: History, Description, 
and Economic Aspects of Giant Facility Created to Encourage Industrial Expansion and Develop 
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and flavor” of the grain.21 As elevators emerged in the late nineteenth century as the dominant 
storage and shipping site for grain, it became evident that mixing grain into a mass stock to draw 
from for shipments was more economical. The USDA’s investigation between 1901 and 1906 
that revealed a lack of “uniformity in grading” likely showcased the chief issue with shifting 
away from weighing and grading by the sack. A single producer’s crop maintained the same 
grade as it made the long journey to its final customer because it never left the packaging it 
started in. The intermingling of grain from different origins would challenge the established 
grade at each step on its journey. New Orleans appears to have returned to the sack system in 
1906 when the state legislature adopted the Larche law that specified each sack of grain had to 
be weighed and certified individually. The only elevator in New Orleans capable of handling the 
law’s new requirements was the Illinois Central Railroad’s Elevator C on Poydras Street.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
21 William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York and London: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 1991), 107. 
Figure 1. Elevator C on Poydras Street as seen in The Railway and 
Engineering Review, July 23, 1898. 
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According to an 1898 article in The Railway and Engineering Review, Elevator C “is not 
situated on the river but . . . has only railroad connections.” Although it was a small elevator with 
a capacity of 250,000-500,000 bushels, it was “arranged especially as a cleaning house and 
handle[d] and improve[d]” the grain it received. The elevator was equipped with automatic 
scales that allowed grain to be sacked and weighed at the same time. The Railway and 
Engineering Review noted the elevator’s equipment was all “necessary to take care of any ‘off 
grade’ grain which may come to the port. . . . [N]o ‘off grade’ grain [was] allowed in the export 
elevators,” making the work in elevator C vital to the Louisiana grain trade.22 Competing 
elevators in New Orleans would either have to build their own facility with similar equipment or 
pay the additional expense to allow Elevator C to handle all grain packaging in order to meet the 
demands of the global grain markets.23  
One of the first indications of scandal within the New Orleans elevators was when the 
Illinois Central Railroad and the Central Elevator and Warehouse Company abruptly shut down 
Elevator C in November 1930. The two companies argued the elevator was being operated at a 
loss and that there were plenty of other local facilities that could handle the grain traffic. Still, 
Elevator C was viewed by the Louisiana Public Service Commission as a public utility “whose 
service could not be discontinued or curtailed without authority from the commission.” If 
Elevator C was still the only facility equipped to meet the requirements of the Larche law, its 
closure would prove a serious detriment to the industry as a whole, although Illinois Central’s 
defense suggests other facilities had installed the necessary equipment in the intervening twenty-
                                               
22 “Elevator System of Illinois Central R.R. At New Orleans,” The Railway and Engineering Review, July 
23, 1898: 400. 
23 “Grain Trade Problem,” The Times-Democrat, July 28, 1906: 5. 
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four years.24 Coinciding with the dispute over Elevator C, Robert C. Jordan, who had been the 
superintendent of the Public Elevator since June 1929, was suspended for 30 days. The reasons 
for his suspension were never made public, but he came to the elevator from a position with 
Illinois Central after having previously served as the superintendent of the Stuyvesant Elevators 
(conveniently operated by Illinois Central). It stands to reason that Jordan somehow found 
himself involved in the controversial closing of Elevator C and was asked to step down.25 Jordan 
was succeeded by Clarence Sears who was replaced in early 1932 by John B. Sanford.26 When 
Sanford was asked to resign in October 1940, he was replaced by Charles J. Winters.27 
          It is unclear how long the Larche law was in effect but it was the earliest attempt at 
“protect[ing] both buyers and sellers of grain and other commodities through standardization of 
grades and other factors bearing on quality and price,” as the president of the New Orleans Board 
of Trade emphasized 1953.28 The Town Talk of Alexandria also wrote in 1953 that the Port of 
                                               
24 “Hearing on Closing of Grain Elevator Called,” The Town Talk, August 25, 1930: 5. 
25 As the Times-Picayune notes, “it was definitely understood in local grain circles that before the 
expiration of the 30-day period Mr. Jordan’s term of employment will be formally ended by action of the 
[dock] board.” See “Head of Public Grain Elevator Off ‘On Leave’,” Times-Picayune, November 19, 
1930: 1. 
26 “Public Elevator Employee Given Day to Help Long,” Times-Picayune, September 12, 1934: 2. 
27 Sanford is an anomaly in that he was named superintendent of the elevator in 1923, succeeding his 
brother C.F. Sanford. John B. Sanford stepped down as superintendent in 1929 to devote his attention to 
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Picayune, October 12, 1940: 1. “Grain Elevator Men Give Orleanian Post,” Times-Picayune, May 22, 
1948: 16. “Grain Society Plans Meeting,” Times-Picayune, December 10, 1949: 20. 
28 “Grain Elevator Dedication Held,” Times-Picayune, December 1, 1953: 43. 
 A new act was adopted in June 1916 promising to “provide for the inspection and analysis of all 
commercial feeding stuffs sold for use in the State of Louisiana, and for the payment by the seller of the 
inspection fee therefor.” See Mr. Norris, “Act No. 38. House Bill No. 120. An Act,” in Acts Passed by the 
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New Orleans was “second only to New York in dollar value of cargoes . . . [and] rated first by 
shipping men in honesty and efficiency.”29 It is significant, therefore, to note that the earliest 
incident directly related to what would become the Heist investigation happened in January 1953 
when an investigation was opened into controversial mixing of “unfit” Canadian wheat at public 
grain elevators in New Orleans and Houston. More specifically, the wheat had been marked 
“unfit for human consumption,” and had only been permitted to enter the United States for 
export, presumably as animal feed elsewhere.30 Charles J. Winters, superintendent of the Public 
Elevator, admitted to accepting $36,000 from Transit Grain, Co. of Fort Worth, Texas, for the 
mixing of this wheat with quality American wheat, as well as for “supplying information about 
grain stocks in storage.”31 A representative of Transit Grain asserted the company was “not now 
and never has been an exporter of grain” and “never applied for or received any subsidy 
payments under the international wheat agreement.”32  
In a more detailed report of the investigation, Stephen S. Serrapede stated Bunge 
Corporation along with “an allied firm in Minneapolis” had imported 8 million bushels of the 
unfit wheat. Some of the wheat, Serrapede contended, “went into American flour” while some 
was exported.33 From the various news reports, the issue at the center of this small-scale scandal 
                                               
General Assembly of the State of Louisiana at the Regular Session Begun and Held in the City of Baton 
Rouge on the Eighth Day of May, 1916 (Baton Rouge: Ramires-Jones Printing Company, 1916), 100. 
29 The Town Talk, January 28, 1953. 
30 “Court Considers Dismissal of Charges in Grain Hearing,” The Waco News-Tribune, December 15, 
1954: 2. 
31 The practice of mixing inferior stock into a good supply was not a novel idea in 1953. Historian Lewis 
Cecil Gray reports “owners, factors and ship captains” outside Philadelphia would mix “condemned flour 
with their cargoes after inspection,” delivering a notoriously poor product to Virginia. See Lewis Cecil 
Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860, Vol. II (New York: Peter Smith, 
1941), 608. 
32 “Reported in Houston – Wheat ‘Bootleggers’ Mix Good Grain with Inferior,” The Baytown Sun, 
January 30, 1953: 1. 
33 Fred Othman, “Not Fit for Pigs,” The Pittsburgh Press, May 14, 1953: 19. 
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appears to have been monetary as opposed to the actual safety of consumers. Fred Othman, 
writing for the Pittsburgh Press, stated, “The plot is simple enough: Shriveled and broken 
kernels of wheat can be imported from Canada under our customs regulations as wheat unfit for 
human consumption. The duty on it is eight cents per bushel, as compared to better than 20 cents 
for first class grain.” Another article conclusively noted, “Under terms of a 1935 law, no duty 
was paid on low-grade Canadian wheat when it entered” the United States and “no duty must be 
paid unless the grain [was] sent out of the U.S.” Therefore, it is likely the U.S. government was 
“cheated out of $4 million in duty payments” in this scheme.34  
Othman further notes, “D. E. Young, who actually did the mixing in Houston with his 
little shovel, received between $8000 and $9000 . . . while the chief clerk, Jack Cherry, got 
between $6000 and $7000. All these gentlemen were fired.”35 Winters resigned a few months 
after the investigation opened, citing “personal reasons,” although his true reasons were later 
revealed to the public when he was indicted in March 1954 and full details of the investigation 
were published in area newspapers.36 Winters’ indictment was ultimately dismissed in February 
1955 but cracks were beginning to appear in New Orleans’ reputation for honesty and efficiency. 
Even with action taken against the personnel involved, Othman’s article from May 1953 still 
raises the question of why offer a label of “unfit for human consumption” if it was of small 
consequence that “you may have eaten some of it and so, doubtless, have I.”37 As the grain trade 
came under closer scrutiny over the next two decades, the substandard quality of grain being 
                                               
34 “Port of Houston Grain Scandals Spreads,” The Baytown Sun, April 24, 1953: 1, 2. 
35 Fred Othman, “Not Fit for Pigs,” The Pittsburgh Press, May 14, 1953: 19. 
36 “Elevator Probe Data Withheld,” Times-Picayune, April 18, 1953: 3.  
Winters was succeeded by Dunkin Welte of Bloomington, Illinois, who was followed by Arthur 
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offered to consumers was always a secondary issue to monetary schemes that could divert money 
from the U.S. government.   
 By the early 1960s, when orchestrated schemes of theft and shortweighting were in their 
infancy at various elevators in Louisiana and Texas, there were calls for the USDA to begin 
investigating some of the companies in the area. Those calls went unheeded. Some European 
customers had lodged complaints with the U.S. government about inferior shipments, and in 
December 1968, Japan suspended U.S. wheat purchases due to a “quality issue.”38 Again, these 
complaints focused more on being delivered a lesser quality than what they had paid for. There 
was never a strong concern for what poor quality grain could lead to once it found its way into 
bread and other consumables. According to James Trager, when the Russians were negotiating 
their large-scale purchases in 1972, they refused to buy American spring wheat despite its 
similarities to Russian-grown wheat. The Russians were worried about possible ergotism in the 
American spring wheat. Ergot fungus contains traces of the alkaloid drug ergotamine, which, if 
baked in dough, “is transformed into LSD, the most powerful hallucinogen known to man.” A 
major epidemic of ergotism had swept through parts of Russia in the late 1920s, making the 
consequences of poor-quality grain consumption very real for Russian grain buyers in 1972.39 
The specifics as to why the Canadian wheat was labeled “unfit for human consumption” are not 
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clear but the presence of ergot fungus spores were never mentioned in news reports.40 Later 
charges of inferior grain shipments pointed to the presence of rocks, dust, and “foreign material,” 
a signal of laziness at the elevators more than anything truly sinister. Japan’s exit from the U.S. 
grain market and the Soviet Union’s entrance both occurred at critical moments for the USDA 
and the White House, disrupting agricultural policy and the literal flow of grain. 
When Japan suspended their purchases of U.S. wheat in 1968, Richard Nixon had just 
won the presidential election, with his slim victory coming largely on the back of votes from 
farm states. By early August 1968, wheat prices had fallen to their lowest point since 1960, 
fetching $1.19 per bushel. At the time of his reelection in 1972, the price had risen to about $2.29 
per bushel. This was a far cry from the average price under $2 the market had held since March 
1964 and Nixon’s administration sought to “reduce pressures on wheat prices.”41 In December 
1972, the USDA announced “farm and warehouse loans on stored grain would not be extended,” 
meaning farmers who had been holding onto wheat from previous harvests would have to sell. In 
January 1973, the Commodity Credit Corporation was “ordered to dispose of all grain stocks 
‘except for small quantities for emergency reserves.’” As a result of this order, Trager says, 
“farmers with bins full of wheat (some had 40,000 to 60,000 bushels in storage) loaded up their 
                                               
40 Under the new FGIS regulations, inspectors were instructed to look specifically for ergot in the 
samples. Twenty-first century standards indicate that “anything over.05% of the sample being ergot,” 
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trucks and converged on country grain elevators. But grain elevators throughout the wheat belts 
were backed up with wheat they were unable to move for lack of rail-cars.”42  
A representative of the Burlington Northern Railroad noted the bottleneck was caused by 
a sudden need to move “three- or four-years’ crops in one year.” This was a result not only of the 
order to the CCC but of the purchases made by the big grain companies to meet their Russian 
contracts. “The railroad pipeline to the Gulf ports is full,” the Burlington representative said, 
“and is going to stay full through December of 1973 and probably through the first half of 1974.” 
Strikes at the ports protesting the Russian sales were also tying up rail cars. Because 
longshoreman, particularly at Gulf elevators, were not loading ships, rail cars arriving at the 
elevators could not be unloaded. Even as this incoming stock sat idle at the elevators, it was 
becoming evident that all of the grain brought out of storage still would not be enough to cover 
the extreme size of the contracted sales. It is interesting to note that the USDA’s behavior 
throughout the 1972 “Great Grain Robbery” came under scrutiny and was investigated by the 
FBI in July 1975 as the Cereal Heist case was growing.  
 Louisiana’s rice industry may have been exempt from price pressures and the disposal of 
CCC stocks but it certainly was not free from scandal. In the early 1950s, while the grain 
industry was distracted by the Canadian wheat controversy, the roux of scandal in the 
southwestern rice prairies began to thicken. This particular scandal was more localized but its 
affects were far more personal because of the intimate nature of the rice producing community. 
Eric Broussard, a few generations and several hundred miles removed from his family’s place in 
the rice industry, expresses some annoyance in knowing that his family once had a profitable 
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stake in the Lake Arthur rice dryer. He was told they lost the drier long before he was born but 
he still remembers the legend surrounding that loss that was passed down to him: 
Supposedly, my great-grandfather [Louis] . . . in some way, shape, or form came to own it, the rice dryer in 
Lake Arthur [Louisiana]. . . . Well, the story that's been handed down in my family has to do mostly with 
my great-aunt, whose married name was Jewell Boutte. . . . When Louis passed away, my great-
grandmother, Hattie [Broussard], had led a pretty sheltered life, meaning that she did not know how to run 
a business or had any desire to. So somehow the responsibility fell to Jewell even though there were two 
brothers who were older than she was. But she came to deal with the administrative, day-to-day running 
operations of the Lake Arthur rice dryer, and some time in the late sixties had either become divorced or 
widowed because she started seeing this man from out of town and she let him have access to the rice 
dryer's accounts, ledgers, and he had access to the bank accounts themselves. . . . One season some time 
between the actual sale of the rice and the pay out, the tall, dark stranger from out of town that Jewell had 
shacked up with emptied the accounts and was never heard from again. As a result, the dryer - Well, more 
importantly, or more to the fact, my great-grandmother, Hattie, had to file bankruptcy. And in an attempt to 
settle the debt with the farmers, the rice dryer changed hands and was out of my family's control.43 
 
 Because of the nature of the rice industry’s voucher system pay structure in which the 
farmers did not get paid until the rice had been sold by the dryer, it was easy for dryer operators 
to defraud their own customers or simply make poor decisions. For the Broussard family, finding 
an explanation for their loss of control at the rice dryer resulted in the creation of this con 
narrative that has proven inaccurate. It is possible that there were gendered implications behind 
the story in that Jewell and Hattie’s femininity could have easily led them to be taken advantage 
of. If Louis had been in charge of the mill’s operations for much of the time it was in the 
Broussard family, did these two women even have a working knowledge of the rice industry or 
the mill’s functions within it? Business records show Jewell and her husband Juluis A. Boutte 
listed as agents for Lake Rice Mill (also called Smith and Boutte Rice Co., Inc) beginning in July 
1958 – the company was renamed Maple Hughes, Inc. at some point between 1958 and 1985.44 
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If Louis truly did own the rice dryer, that ownership had changed hands on paper six years before 
Louis died. It is unclear why Louis disappeared from the business records at this point but Jewell 
and Hattie were not left without a masculine business partner. Beyond Jewell’s husband, there 
was Jack R. Smith – presumably the Smith in Smith and Boutte Rice Co. By forming a 
partnership with Smith, the Broussard/Boutte family also became connected to Rex Rice Co., 
which was owned by Smith. Rex Rice was the primary company caught up in scandal.  
Rex Rice’s drying business fell apart in the mid-1970s and a lawsuit was filed by 
Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., charging mismanagement on the part of Smith. In the June 1974 
hearing, it was stated that the lawsuit “derive[d] from an instrument confected on May 18, 1962, 
in which Jack R. Smith, Matthew L. Hanagriff, Hattie F. Broussard, and Mrs. Jewell B. Boutte 
executed a guaranty in favor of plaintiff bank for credit which plaintiff extended to Rex Rice 
Company, Inc. . . . up to the amount of $200,000.”45 Jewell and Hattie’s signatures on the loan 
documentation in question signified their role as stockholders in Rex Rice. An original suit filed 
on March 25, 1969 was settled in December of that year with the back receiving “substantially 
all of the assets belonging to Jack Smith, Jewell B. Boutte, and Hattie F. Broussard” – likely the 
bankruptcy referred to by Eric.  
A separate hearing on June 28, 1974 in the case of Louisiana Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Roanoke Rice Co-op offers a version of the “pertinent facts” related to the Rex Rice/Lake Rice 
Mill case: 
In the 1940’s Maple Hughes was owner and operator of the Lake Rice Mill located in Lake Arthur, 
Louisiana, and rice dryer and warehouse facilities at Roanoke, Louisiana. Apparently during this period 
(because of the fact that a mill cannot issue its own bonded warehouse receipts) Hughes began the practice 
of issuing warehouse receipts, under the name of the Roanoke facilities, as warehouseman, on rice stored at 
the Lake Rice Mill. The warehouse receipts were then taken to various banks and pledged as collateral for 
loans to finance the mills’ operations Hughes sold the Roanoke facilities to the newly incorporate Roanoke 
Rice Co-op, Inc. in 1950. 
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After this transaction, Hughes became president of the newly created co-operative, remaining in that 
position until 1959 when Thomas L. Thomas was elected to the post. In 1951, John P. Hudson, who had 
previously been an assistant manager under Hughes, became a general manager of the Roanoke Rice Co-
op. . . Roanoke continued to issue bonded warehouse receipts on rice stored in Lake Rice Mill facilities by 
Hughes. 
Subsequently, Lake Rice Mill . . . and another rice mill facility in Eunice, Louisiana, Rex Rice Co., Inc. . . . 
came under the same ownership and management. Jack R. Smith was the principal stockholder, president, 
and manager. From time to time Smith also needed financing for his various rice mill operations. In order 
to obtain collateral for loans which he sought, Smith established the B.H.S. Warehouse Co. in Eunice, also 
owned by him, for the purpose of issuing warehouse receipts to either Rex or Lake for rice owned or 
possessed by either at these two facilities. Smith continued the arrangement with John Hudson, the manager 
of Roanoke’s facilities at Roanoke, for Roanoke to act as warehouseman, issuing warehouse receipts in its 
name for rice stored at the Lake Arthur facility. During this period Lake leased its facilities to Roanoke for 
$1.00 a year.46  
Beginning in 1955, it was reported that Rex was extending its business through the 
construction of new facilities and the purchase of new equipment. Although the court records do 
not offer an explicit answer for the financial problems encountered by Smith as the head of both 
Rex and the Lake Rice Mill, it is possible there was simply not enough rice activity to support 
the immense growth he had been promoting.47 “Around 1968,” court records note, “Hudson 
arranged for LeRoy Martin, a bookkeeper employed by Lake, to act as an agent for the 
convenience of the operations of Roanoke and Lake . . . allowing him to issue warehouse 
receipts in the name of Roanoke.” Warehouse receipts were then issued to Rex “for rice 
allegedly contained in the Lake Arthur facilities” that could then be “pledged as security” for 
various loans made to Rex by Louisiana Bank & Trust, Co. By the late 1960s, those loans were 
defaulting and the Louisiana Bank & Trust sought to recoup their money. The first suit filed in 
February 1969 alleged “two large deposited checks, for which credit had been given, had been 
dishonored and that the two rice mills owed the bank in excess of ½ million dollars.” The bank 
secured an “writ of attachment on all of the properties of Rex and Lake, including the rice stored 
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at the Lake Arthur facilities.” It is significant to note that Rex was also $117,520 in debt to Bank 
and Trust of Wharton, Texas. Rex and Lake were “forced into receivership in the state court on 
March 26, 1969, by their creditors, who were allegedly owed in excess of 2½ million dollars.”48 
The two facilities were then leased to Farmers Rice Milling Company of Lake Charles for one 
year to ensure to sale of the rice in storage. By September 1972, the assets for both Rex Rice and 
Lake Rice Mill were sold at auction in an attempt to get the remainder of the loan money 
repaid.49  
Investigations by the USDA ordered by Louisiana Bank & Trust during the time of the 
lawsuits showed that rice at both facilities was either non-existent compared to the paper records 
or was of inferior quality.50 Much of this same falsified paperwork and non-existent product 
would soon be uncovered in other areas of the Louisiana grain industry in the FBI’s largest 
investigation to date. In an attempt to prevent the rice industry from falling victim to larger 
patterns of theft en route to export points, the farmers requested new weighing inspections be 
implemented along with the establishment of an inspection station in Eunice, Louisiana. Even if 
the export elevators were not legally required to pay out based on the weights registered at 
origins points like Eunice, having an official weight certification before the product arrived at 
those elevators would make any discrepancies easily recognizable and reportable.51   
One of the first indications of major trouble within the larger Louisiana grain industry 
came on the heels of the June 1974 rice mill hearings when WBRZ-TV in Baton Rouge aired a 
story on July 24, 1974, suggesting, “area grain inspectors may be using their positions to defraud 
grain dealers,” an eerily similar allegation to what had been found in the rice mills. Possibly in 
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response to the very fraud discovered in Lake Charles and Eunice, the WBRZ-TV story indicated 
“federal inquiry is presently concentrating on grain-drying operations in the Port Barre-
Opelousas area.”52 A letter from Commissioner of Agriculture Dave Pearce offers an earlier 
possible origin for the case. Dated August 1968, the letter reveals Baton Rouge was already 
under suspicion for “charging excessive fees (for grain inspections) resulting in one-half million 
dollars [in] excessive charges.” When Pearce wrote the letter, he was himself in the midst of a 
controversy over whether USDA inspectors or private inspectors would handle such inspections. 
At the time, it was believed that higher paid private inspectors “would be less susceptible to 
corruption.”53 
 Rufus J. Hebert, owner of a grain drying company in Port Barre, was one of the first 
individuals to appear before a grand jury in New Orleans in connection with the investigation in 
1974. Hebert refused to elaborate on what was said in his testimony when reporters pressured 
him for information. Even in early interviews and inquiries, like that with Hebert, it was apparent 
that any possible fraud would center around the role of state licensed employees responsible for 
inspecting the grain. James Hesburg, a local manager for Cargill, revealed “if an inspector 
falsified the record his company wouldn’t know it.”54 Such a system of ignorance, or blind trust, 
left the companies and the elevators wide open to any number of abuses. The USDA later 
admitted that while there had been “a dramatic increase over the past 10 years in the amount of 
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grain being inspected . . . the number of inspectors ha[d] dropped,” another obstacle to the 
maintenance of proper inspection protocol.55 
 It is not known whether there was an official complaint or complainant that instigated the 
investigation, although The Times reports several indictments came after foreign buyers 
complained to the U.S. government about receiving wheat or corn shipments containing dirt and 
other debris. These complaints, however, came over a year after the first published reports about 
the investigation.56 Senator Hubert Humphrey later claimed the USDA had been aware of 
inspection problems since 1969 but their attempts to correct those problems had “been typified 
by ‘delay and inaction.’ ”57 A 1973 USDA audit revealed a proposal to investigate Cook 
Industries, corroborating Humphrey’s claim that the USDA was well aware of issues under their 
jurisdiction. A USDA source said the request for an investigation stemmed from claims that an 
inspector at Cook’s New Orleans elevator was “ordered . . . not to issue a cleanliness certificate 
to [a] ship which had arrived at the Cook dock to be loaded. The reason was said to be that the 
firm did not have enough grain in the elevator to load the ship with the amount of grain it had 
contracted to sell.”58 Willard W. Griffin of the Office of Inspector General reported 
“irregularities in the inspection, grading and weighing of grain based upon [a] review of certain 
elevator records” in 1970. Griffin’s “paper investigation” pointed to the Bayside Elevator in 
Reserve, Louisiana, and the Mississippi River Grain Elevator in Myrtle Grove, Louisiana. By 
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1973 when the USDA performed their audit, Griffin had been told to “drop the matter” as his 
materials were “not enough to prove negligence by [the] grain inspectors.”59 
FBI agent Robert Isakson, who served as the co-case agent on the Heist investigation, 
recalls being approached by a fellow agent (possibly in 1975) with information about grain theft 
on the docks. Surveilling the docks had turned up no concrete evidence, suggesting the theft was 
much larger than a few missing bags of grain. The agents then turned their attention to the 
massive elevators along the Mississippi River. Beginning with the Public Grain Elevator and a 
few others, Isakson and his co-case agent set about interviewing employees to get at the root of 
the theft. They narrowed their focus to the men responsible for weighing the grain, thinking, 
“Okay, well, these are the guys that could actually manipulate something.” In St. Rose, 
Louisiana, they interviewed an older inspector (the “crawfish man”) who broke the case wide 
open. As he and the agents were chatting over a meal of crawfish, he confessed, stating, “We’ve 
been stealing grain at this elevator [the Public Elevator] since 1916.”60  
         The basic fraud scheme, as described by the “crawfish man,” relied almost exclusively on 
the inspectors. Decades of privatization had worked in their favor since no one was checking 
their work, allowing them to easily manipulate reports and be manipulated themselves. The 
established grain inspection system at the Public Grain Elevator was outlined by Times-Picayune 
as follows: “A load of grain comes in aboard a barge or railcar. A sampler, using a 6-foot or 12-
foot probe - a long, hollow tube capable of catching and trapping grain its entire length, draws 
out samples from different areas of the container. A sample is taken from five different places in 
a boxcar, 15 or 20 places in a barge, and in each compartment of a hopper railcar (which dumps 
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the grain into a hopper on the bottom of the car). Sacked in bags from eight pounds and up and 
tagged, the grain is brought inside to the laboratory for grading.”61 As noted by Kia Adams-
Mikesh, vice president of North Dakota Grain Inspection (NDGI), the number of inspections 
undertaken by a single inspection group in one year could climb into the millions, partially 
because a single crop of grain is inspected and graded more than once throughout its journey. “If 
you have grain that is being grown in North Dakota, that farmer, a lot of time, is coming to an 
agency like [NDGI] to determine what it is that they’re growing – what the quality of their grain 
is. Then it can go into a grain elevator and it’s then sampled and graded again before it’s getting 
into the elevator so they, maybe, know which bins to put it in (and how to pay the farmer). Then 
they go to outbound railcars that could be getting sold to the [Providence and Worcester 
Railroad] and then it’s usually graded again there as it’s probably going onto a ship. . . . The 
grain can change a lot in its journey, so it’s very important that people are making sure they 
know what the quality of the grain is no matter where it is in its journey.”62 The grade assigned 
to a shipment of grain is the key component in determining the value of the grain; it’s what keeps 
the grain industry running as a lucrative operation. Private inspection in the mid-1970s, 
inspectors argued, was “a $21 million-a-year business.” By 1975, grain inspection was being 
performed primarily by privatized entities with “88 federally licensed private groups . . . and by 
23 state agencies” in operation.63 There was a serious risk associated with inspectors not only 
cutting corners because their work load was so heavy but with them becoming developing 
relationships with elevator personnel that could benefit from “fudging the numbers.” With 
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minimal active oversight, the inspectors were permitted to operate on their own judgement, both 
professionally and morally. 
 As grain entered an elevator, it was weighed on a highly simplistic scale that would 
swing back and forth before ultimately settling in the middle with an official number. As each 
weight was registered, a ticket would be printed for the elevator’s records. The men in charge of 
the scales would squeeze a button to catch that middle spot before the scale stopped on its own 
because it could take a while to settle and this would speed up the process. They also had the 
ability to stop the scale on either side, stopping it on the down side as the grain came in and on 
the up side as it was weighed again on the way out of the elevator, meaning the grain was short 
weighed as it came in but the loss was “covered” on the other side. According to Isakson, this 
theft was not meant to be intentional at the outset, “it was the percentage just because of the way 
the scale was swinging.”64 Somewhat anticipating the potential for theft given the volume of 
grain handled by the elevators, The Morning Advocate asked in 1962, “How does the [Public 
Grain] elevator keep tabs on such a vast and fluctuating commodity?” The answer: “In a small 
room near the front of the elevator on the river side a group of employees constantly chalk data 
onto a blackboard mockup of each silo. This data includes temperatures, grain types, grade 
numbers, and other technical information written into circles representing each silo.”65 Who is to 
say this blackboard data was also being manipulated. After all, it was not designed to be a 
permanent record. 
As with the 1953 investigation, delivering an inferior product to the customer became a 
central part of the Heist scheme. In tandem with the manipulated weights, the inspectors were 
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being pressured to grade the grain as wetter when it came in and dryer as it went out. The 
category of wetness or dryness greatly affects the grade the grain is given and the subsequent 
value of that grain. By downgrading a shipment as it arrived, the elevator was cheating the grain 
producer by paying them less than what their grain was worth. Conversely, when the grain was 
then upgraded, its weight was “increased” for delivery to a customer, the customer was being 
cheated by being given a lower quality and quantity than they had originally paid for.66 One 
inspector cited by Morgan in 1975 noted, “Whole ships have been loaded with junk” in this 
cheating scheme, delivering grain loaded with excess dust and foreign material to meet the 
contracted weight. According to this anonymous inspector, “the quality of the grain in [the] 
elevator . . . sometimes was so poor that none could be found to make up false samples, so a few 
bushels of better-quality grain was purchased elsewhere.”67 
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The theft tied to weight and grade began as something the employees did on behalf of the 
companies, an economic action benefitting the companies’ bottom lines. The employees soon 
realized that they were not benefitting from this system. Working “on the ground” in the 
elevators on a daily basis, they knew that the elevators’ design with multiple silos was almost 
intentionally planned for such theft; the silos offered a built-in way to store the stolen grain. As 
the employees began skimming a small percentage from each shipment for themselves, they kept 
“a side chit-chat of it,” a running tab of how much they had and which silo it had been put in. 
Having thousands of bushels of grain of their own was great except simply storing the grain was 
not a money-making venture. The grain needed to be sold. In this new twist on the Heist, the 
elevator employees who had been stealing and storing grain enlisted tug boat operators to 
“move” it. In actuality, they bribed the tug boat captain to move an incoming barge that had been 
identified as having an identical amount of grain onboard to what was already in the employees’ 
silo. The inspectors and weighers at the elevator would manufacture tickets to say the barge had 
been unloaded while the tug boat captain would move the barge to a nearby salvage facility. 
Once at the salvage facility, the grain would be unloaded into trucks and then brought back to the 
original elevator where it was then sold. In essence, the elevator paid for the same shipment of 
grain twice while their in-house records reflected an available stock the was three times higher 
than the physical stock on hand: the employees’ grain counted as 1/3 of the total and the 
barge/truck grain counted as the other 2/3 even though it was all the same grain. The money from 
the truck sale was split amongst the elevator employees involved, the tugboat operator, and the 
salvage company.68 
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 A tugboat captain in Gretna, Louisiana, confessed to having received a $15,000 cash 
bribe to move a barge to the salvage facility but provide documentation that he had moved it to 
the elevator. He had gotten the money on a Friday and spent it all by Sunday. He told the FBI 
everything he knew about the roundabout sales strategy: who was involved and how they did it. 
He was able to point the agents to other captains and the salvage company they used. The 
checking accounts for the salvage company revealed they were receiving $250,000-$350,000 
every few weeks from undetermined business transactions. Even in the highly lucrative grain 
industry, the FBI recognized $250,000 was a suspiciously large sum of money to be taking in 
every few weeks. The company’s secretary had been tasked with taking the checks for these 
enormous amounts to the bank to be cashed, so her name and signature were all over the physical 
evidence from the bank statements – and she was responsible for handling vast sums of cash 
money before it was distributed to the various miscreants. There were two or three similar 
companies undertaking the same scheme, and the FBI never found an elevator that wasn’t also 
participating in the overall Heist in some way.  
At the time, the Heist investigation produced the “largest civil recovery in the history of 
the FBI or the Department of Justice. It was around $400 million that [was] seized, or that [the 
companies] paid to get out of the criminal [system].”69 As evidence of this theft and fraud 
emerged, the companies argued they never instructed employees to steal. Instead, they merely 
“encouraged [employees] to be aggressive. Not to sit there and let the elevator thing swing and 
therefore you take four hours to unload a barge. . . . if you take it one way or the other faster, 
whatever way it is, you can unload a barge in two hours. So we want to unload more barges and 
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move more stuff along through our grain elevator.” Employees testified that they were given a 
directive to take the weight on a specific side of the scale because they would “get [a precise] 
percent every time, not an average that comes to zero.” It was clearly advantageous to the 
inspectors to move the grain through the elevator as quickly as possible regardless of how the 
scale was rigged since their pay rate was determined by the efficiency of the elevator’s loading 
and unloading processes. 70 
 Outside the elevators, the Heist was transformed into a true scam by Le Trac Land, Inc., a 
company formed in 1974. As the Times-Picayune notes, the company was established “for the 
avowed purposed of planting, cultivating, and selling soybeans.” The corporation entered into an 
agreement with Rufus J. Hebert “for the lease of 250 acres of land, purportedly for the growing 
of soybeans.” In furtherance of the alleged scheme, “Hebert and John Earl Bonin, Hebert’s 
bookkeeper, would falsify records to show fictitious costs for the planting, growing, and 
harvesting of the soybeans, storage at Hebert’s grain elevator, and the trucking of them to the 
Public Grain Elevator in New Orleans, and the sale to Peavey Co.” When Hebert was indicted in 
May 1975, the charges additionally claimed that Richard Blades, an inspector, “prepared 
fraudulent truck grain tickets to show receipt, handling, grading, weighing, and storage of 
truckloads of soybeans that were never delivered to Hebert’s grain elevator.” It is alleged that 
“the fraudulent grain tickets were transmitted by wire from the New Orleans Public Grain 
Elevator to the Peavey company, which would then issue checks to Hebert’s grain elevator or Le 
Trac Land, Inc.”71 Blades’ inspection license was suspended as a result of his own indictment.72 
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The maximum penalties for Hebert, Blades, and others charged in this arm of the Heist 
conspiracy was five years in prison and a $10,000 fine, plus 10 years in prison and another 
$10,000 fine for any additional charges that may be uncovered.73 
 By June 1975, with fifteen indictments in New Orleans and five in Houston, the 
investigation had widened to include Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Duluth, Minnesota.74 As the 
investigation moved into their home turf of Minnesota, Cargill executives were forced to address 
it. In a letter to Cargill employees, the company’s president, Fred M. Seed, noted how the 
accusations at the heart of the investigation could not only damage the reputation of American 
grain but, more importantly, the reputation of Cargill. “No one suffers more,” he wrote, “than 
Cargill [if there is a] lack of confidence in the marketing system.” Soon after Seed’s letter was 
modified for publication as an Op-Ed in the July 13, 1975 issue of the Minneapolis Tribune, 
Cargill again opened sales negotiations with the Soviet Union, emphasizing the necessity of 
maintaining international confidence in American grain. Cook had already sold 2 million metric 
tons of wheat to the Soviet Union and Cargill added another 1.2 million tons. Within a week, the 
big trio was working together again as Continental sold 5.6 million metric tons of corn and 
barley to the Soviets. Further sales were temporarily suspended on August 11, 1975, in an 
attempt to slow the sale of grain to Russia by other countries, some of which were nothing more 
than international arms of the American grain companies.75 On October 20, 1975, a new five-
year agreement was made with the Soviets on which they were committed to buying six million 
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metric tons of grain annually. Both parties to the agreement also conceded to spacing purchases 
“as evenly as possible over each 12-month period.”76  
 In the midst of these new developments with the Soviet Union, The Times reported the 
Public Grain Elevator, the New Orleans Board of Trade, and C.B. Fox, Co. had been named as 
defendants in a federal lawsuit involving Molino Harinero Sula S.A. in Honduras. The Honduran 
company claimed they were cheated out of $20,713 when a ship arrived “87 short tons lighter 
than its certificate specified.” Molino Harinero had initially filed suit against the shipping 
company, Marine Trading, in May 1974. On July 8, 1975, Marine Trading filed a countersuit 
against the Public Elevator and the other companies. This lawsuit added further scrutiny to the 
elevator where three inspectors had already been indicted in connection to the Heist 
investigation.77  
Peavey Company, Pike Grain Company, C.B. Fox Company, and Public Grain Elevator 
of New Orleans, Inc. were all fined $10,000 in early 1977 in connection with the Honduran short 
change. The four companies responsible for operating the Public Grain Elevator had been 
indicted under charges that they had run a conspiracy to shortweigh shipments between January 
1970 and June 1976, resulting in “the unearned accumulation . . . of about 1.4 million bushels of 
salable grain.”78 Several of the other major players in the grain industry also found themselves 
facing such conspiracy charges. In December 1975, six Bunge employees, including a former 
vice president, pled guilty to a short weighing conspiracy. The company itself pleaded no contest 
to the charges and was subsequently fined $20,000. In March 1976, Garnac Grain, Inc. and ADM 
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also pleaded no contest to charges of short weighting; both companies paid a $10,000 fine. Cook 
was charged with short weighting on thirty-seven separate instances. The company pleaded no 
contest and was fined $10,000 for each of the thirty-seven instances, equating to a fine of 
$370,000. By the end of 1976, at least five companies had been charged with such short 
weighing schemes. Mississippi Grain Elevator, Inc. was levied a $60,000 fine after pleading no 
contest to six such counts in May.79 
 Almost forty indictments had been returned by the federal grand jury in New Orleans at 
the end of July 1975. U.S. Attorney Gerald J. Gallinghouse said at the time that the investigation 
had not even kicked into high gear and these indictments represented “the tip of the iceberg.”80 
Bunge was the first company to be indicted by the grand jury, charged with a conspiracy to steal 
millions of dollars’ worth of grain intended for overseas customers. The Bunge scheme had 
allegedly begun in the summer of 1961 and, according to James Risser, the company had been 
investigated by the USDA in 1973.81 The investigation was ultimately dropped because it “failed 
to turn up enough evidence warranting legal action against the firm.” The company was 
suspected of “circumventing” the U.S. Grain Standards Act when they loaded a total of fifteen 
ships bound for foreign ports with grain that had not been inspected or graded. Risser notes 
“Bunge officials insisted that [their international] buyers . . . were fully aware that they were 
buying uninspected and ungraded grain,” a defense the USDA did not accept. Bunge also 
insisted that as a result of the grain exporting boom of 1972, the facilities simply were not 
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available for conducting the required inspections – a more plausible yet equally problematic 
defense.82  
 With the recent indictment of Bunge and the revelations about their long running scheme, 
Cook soon found itself coming under more intense scrutiny at their Bayside Elevator in Reserve. 
The former superintendent of the elevator, Melvin L. Hibbets, had been suspended on July 8, 
1975. Hibbets had been promoted to vice president of Cook’s grain division in 1972, making him 
increasingly suspect of orchestrating schemes of theft at the elevator. In fact, New York Times 
reporter William Robbins wrote in June 1975, “An official of the Agriculture Department’s grain 
division as early as 1972 named a New Orleans executive of Cook Industries, Inc. [Hibbets] as a 
figure with ‘a long history of being involved in apparent irregularities involving grain 
inspection.’ ”83 News of Hibbets’ suspension followed on the heels of accusations from E.W. 
“Ned” Cook that the company’s phones were tapped and the government had planted spies 
within the Cook ranks. The casual nature of Ned Cook’s accusations spoke less to fears about the 
investigation than they did about the general elusiveness of the grain industry at large. He told an 
interviewer, “Some guy up there could be getting some information and giving it to some of my 
competitors.”84  
In August 1975, two of Bunge's Destrehan elevator employees - Debring A. Negrotto, Jr., 
elevator superintendent, and Harry Otto Dolsen, Sr., elevator manager - were named in an 
indictment of eleven individuals charged with “failing to pay $251,581 in income tax on 
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$713,840 allegedly earned through illegal [grain sales].”85 Less than a week later, twenty-two 
additional men and one grain company, Adnac, were indicted on charges of fraud and theft, 
bringing the indictment total to sixty-three.86 Adnac, a joint venture of ADM and Garnac Grain 
Corporation, was formed to operate the St. Charles Grain Elevator. The St. Charles Elevator was 
also named in the 1972 report that singled out Hibbs. According to Robbins, “The 1972 report 
cited 26 foreign complaints ‘resulting from grain shipped’ from the St. Charles Elevator 
Company during a period when Mr. Hibbets was manager of that elevator.”87 It is not surprising, 
therefore that the Louisiana-based venture in charge of the elevator became the second company 
indicted in the spreading investigation in 1975.88 
 The first full-fledged, multi-state scheme involved in the Heist was uncovered in August 
1975. Louis H. C. Matherne, chief grain inspector for Delta Weighing and Inspection Bureau, 
Inc., was charged with public bribery and perjury. He was accused of accepting $6,500 from 
Alan R. Iliff, grain inspection coordinator for Tabor and Co. of Nevada. Matherne then allegedly 
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gave $500 to Clarence P. Baker, Jr., $200 to Pivon L. Dupuy, both Delta inspectors, and 
pocketed the rest. Matherne’s indictment, returned August 15, 1975, indicated he had been 
accepting cash from Iliff from as early as December 1972. It is unclear why Iliff sought to bribe 
these inspectors, but it is significant to note that Delta served as the official inspection agency for 
the Mississippi River Grain Elevator in Myrtle Grove. Perhaps Iliff was seeking “special 
treatment” of the grain he was sending to Myrtle Grove, similar to that fraudulently awarded to 
Rufus Hebert and Le Trac Land’s soybeans: inspectors at Cargill’s Baton Rouge elevator would 
allegedly grade Hebert’s soybeans “as good quality to make them more valuable [while] 
soybeans delivered by other firms were downgraded to reduce their price so Cargill would not 
detect an overall difference in its elevator operations.”89 The charge of perjury against Matherne 
originated with an accusation of lying to a grand jury about receiving the initial $6,500 and 
passing it on to Dupuy and Baker.90 Dupuy lost both his inspection and grain-weighing licenses 
as a result of his role in this scheme.  
In addition to Dupuy, seven other men had their grain-weighing licenses suspended by 
the USDA in response to numerous indictments returned between August 5 and 7, 1975, 
charging “conspiracy to systematically steal grain from domestic and foreign commerce.”91 By 
the end of the month, sixteen indicted samplers, technicians, and inspectors had their licenses 
suspended or cancelled.92 Harry Otto Dolsen, Sr.’s was the first guilty plea returned in the larger 
Heist case in late August 1975. Debring A. Negrotto, Jr., John H. Gonor, Sr., and Alvin J. 
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Morales, Jr. all pled innocent but were involved in plea-bargaining with federal prosecutors, 
according U.S. Attorney Cornelius R. Heusel.93 Matherne pled innocent in a separate District 
Court hearing that saw George H. Poprick, a Bunge grain elevator employee, and J. M. Rosen, a 
former employee of the Mississippi River Grain Elevator, plead guilty to charges of conspiracy 
and income tax evasion.94  
Six more guilty pleas were entered in early September 1975, including those of Edward 
H. Fleetwood, chief weigher at the Mississippi River Grain Elevator, and Adam A. Dufrene, a 
tugboat captain for River Towing Company.95 Robert Isakson testified that each of the six men 
“had made statements that entire barge loads of grain were stolen.” He went on to say, “in the 
summer of 1971, the men formulated a plan to steal grain destined for export from the Port of 
New Orleans.” Allegedly the six men had stolen “at least three barge loads of grain and then 
falsified records to indicate that it had been properly unloaded.”96 Clark D. Smith, a grain 
inspector at the Mississippi River Grain Elevator, admitted at his arraignment hearing, “I 
falsified records, knowing they were untrue.”97 In a separate case, Andrew Voelkel, assistant 
superintendent of Bunge’s Destrehan elevator, pled guilty to “conspiracy to fraudulently weigh 
grain.”98 By the end of September 1975, forty of the fifty-two individuals named in various 
indictments had filed guilty pleas or been convicted.99 
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 In a far more controversial shipping incident than Bunge’s shipment of “uninspected and 
ungraded grain” in July 1975, the USDA was summoned to New Orleans in January 1976 to 
determine how “rocks, seashells, dust, and spoiled grain got mixed in with 3.2 million bushels of 
corn” bound for Poland.100 The corn had been sold by Cook and was being loaded at their 
Bayside elevator. A spokesman for Cook stated the company would appeal the charges that the 
shipment “contained more than the permitted amount of foreign matter,” contending that the 
condition of the shipment revealed no illegal practices or misgrading.101 After a thorough 
inspection by government inspectors, the ship was cleared with a “qualified certificate” 
indicating “all was not well with the loading” of the grain.102 At the same time, three grain 
inspectors employed at Cargill’s Baton Rouge elevator were indicted for defrauding the 
government and “taking bribes of some $67,000 from an elevator company [Rufus Hebert Grain 
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Elevator Co., Inc.,] . . . that had been shipping through the Cargill terminal.” According to 
Broehl, “Cargill, not involved in this in any way, was the unknowing victim.”103 It is claimed 
that the inspectors were artificially inflating the grades of Hebert’s soybeans to make the more 
valuable while downgrading other soybean shipments. An FBI agent testified he was told by at 
least one of the inspectors that they “downgraded grain at the specific request of Cargill 
personnel and officials. The [inspectors] were threatened by Cargill personnel with the loss of 
their jobs.”104 All three Baton Rouge inspectors had their licenses suspended by the USDA 
despite their pleas of innocence and were fired by Cargill (they later pled guilty to charges of 
improperly inspecting grain and issuing false inspection certificates).105 The USDA also 
complained that the Baton Rouge Port Commission had clearly “ ‘failed to provide the level of 
supervision required by the U.S. Grain Standards Act’ and thus should not be allowed to 
continue” to serve in its present capacity.106 By the end of January 1976 with these new 
indictments, the overall total of indicted individuals had climbed to sixty, forty-eight of whom 
had already been convicted.107  
 After months of deliberation, the USDA finally cancelled the Baton Rouge Port 
Commission’s “authority to check the quality of grain loaded aboard ships for export” in 
December 1976. According to The Times, this was the only state agency to find itself “ensnared” 
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in the growing Heist investigation. The Commission was temporarily replaced by South 
Louisiana Grain Services, Inc., a private inspection firm.108 At the same time, Raymond M. 
Fretz, a former vice president of Cook Industries, was sentenced to eighteen months’ probation 
and a $500 fine for his role in the short weighting schemes. Fretz pleaded guilty to the 
misdemeanor of conspiracy to fraudulently weigh grain at Cook’s elevator in Reserve. Three 
former company vice presidents and a former elevator operator were found guilty alongside 
Fretz, and it was alleged that company executives had “concocted a scheme in 1970 to cheat on 
the actual amount of grain loaded onto ships.”109 When Fretz joined the company in 1972, he 
was apprised of the scheme. An FBI agent testified Fretz had ordered the short weighing to be 
reduced and ultimately stopped.110 The indictment count for the overall investigation was now at 
seventy-one with sixty-seven convictions, “including six of the world’s largest grain exporting 
companies.”111 
 In response to the scale of the case and its impact on the grain industry, the Grain 
Standards Act of 1916 (which had been substantially modified in 1968) was overhauled in 1976. 
Under the new Act first proposed by Senator Dick Clark in September 1975, “private inspection 
agencies were eliminated, replaced with federal inspectors at most ports . . .,” and the Federal 
Grain Inspection Service was reorganized under USDA control.112 Prior to the introduction of the 
new FGIS, federal inspection and grading of grain was prohibited by law, but professional 
inspectors had to pass federal licensing exams.113 Inspectors working in the privatized system 
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argued that “a shift to [the] use of federal employes” would only drive up the cost of inspection 
fees and would “leave no separate agency to conduct ‘appeal’ inspections,” something the 
Agriculture Department had been overseeing, when grain grades were contested by customers.114 
FGIS was scheduled to take over inspection duties at the Destrehan Board of Trade (Bunge) on 
February 12, 1976, the New Orleans Board of Trade (Public Grain Elevator) on May 7, 1976, 
and the South Louisiana Grain Services, Inc. (Cargill) on August 27, 1976. Until that time, the 
private firms listed would continue to operate, likely under greater pressure to conduct their work 
by the book.115 L.C. Carpenter, vice president of Midcontinent Farmers Association, saw 
additional consequences within the act: “Under the new law,” he said, “the cost of grain 
inspection has increased because of the greater number of federal supervisors. These increases 
are passed along to grain farmers. . . . The new procedure results in an assessment of more than 
$6 million a year against U.S. grain farmers to pay for what is essentially a public interest cost.” 
The victims of the widespread theft schemes in the elevators were being victimized once more 
by having to pay for the repercussions of the elevators’ criminal activity.116 Every Louisiana 
representative have voted against the reform bill calling for the implementation of the FGIS 
despite the damage the Heist has done to the state’s reputation as a grain source. 117 
                                               
114 “Inspectors Oppose Takeover of Jobs,” The Town Talk, July 8, 1975: 2. 
Broehl suggests Cargill and the other big grain companies were fearful of the changes to the 
Grain Standards Act, particularly the requirement that exporters be registered with the FGIS, because of 
terroristic threats like high profile kidnappings. Two of the children in the powerful Argentinian Bunge y 
Born family (the parent company of Bunge) had been kidnapped in September 1974 only to be released 
unharmed after a payment to the Montonero terrorists of $60 million and a promise of free food and wide 
publicity for the group from Bunge. See Broehl, Jr., Cargill: Going Global, 291. 
115 Cecil Williams, “Growers Victims of Grain Scandal,” The Town Talk, December 21, 1976: 15. 
116 “Grain industry appealing to revamp inspection law,” The Sedalia Democrat, February 4, 1977: 3. 
Jeffrey Mills, “Grain firms complain about inspection law,” The Daily Leader, February 4, 1977: 12. 
117 Kenneth A. Weiss, “Grain Reform Bill OK’d,” The Times-Picayune, April 3, 1976: 1, 21. 
 As of 2019, grain inspection was partially privatized once more with “unbiased third party” 
companies, like North Dakota Grain Inspection, working on behalf of the Federal Grain Inspection 
Service. See Kia Adams-Mikesh, “Getting the Most of The Grain Grading System,” webinar presented 
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 The Cereal Heist’s potency was largely a result of new revelations of power abuse in the 
age of Watergate.118 It was estimated that the big grain companies had stolen over $1 billion in 
the multiple years the Heist scheme was active. Seventy-one individuals were convicted on fraud 
charges and four of the world’s biggest grain companies “pleaded no contest and paid fines of 
$10,000, the maximum under the law.”119 The Daily World commented in a short piece in March 
1978, “A federal investigation of insurance claims fraud in the metropolitan area may affect the 
insurance industry like the grain scandal that led to 70 indictments affected the grain 
business.”120 The investigation was drawing to a close by February 1977 although some lawsuits 
were still being filed against the big companies by various parties. Any active litigation or other 
developments related to the investigation were soon overshadowed by a bigger industry crisis. 
 
 
 
                                               
for Grain Elevator and Processing Society on March 21, 2019, 
https://register.gotowebinar.com/recording/219305688360506113.  
118 Broehl, Jr. Cargill: Going Global, xiv. 
119 Bill Crider, “Stalks the Public Wrong-Doers,” The Evening Times, September 27, 1977: 5. 
120 “Insurance Probe Might Be ‘Big’,” Daily World, March 24, 1978: 2. 
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LEGACIES OF RISK AND VICE 
 Grain elevator explosions? Well, they had one at Continental Grain. I don't remember the year it was, but  
 it’s way back. I was in the fumigation business then, but I think they had, like, thirty-four people killed in  
 that explosion. A bunch of guys I had hired when I was there. 
   -Jack Coleman, Manager of Cargill grain elevator in Reserve, Louisiana, early 1970s1 
 
           As the grain industry expanded with the advent of the grain elevator in the late nineteenth 
century, new hazards were created by the vast amount of grain being moved through these 
facilities at such a fast pace. While the dust of agricultural products like wheat and rice pose an 
equal risk of combustion, press accounts note only three instances of rice mill explosions (and all 
of them occurred in Asian countries).2 A 1982 report, however, does indicate that a rice mill 
explosion occurred in Jonesboro, Arkansas, on May 28, 1964, but this appears to be a minority 
event compared to the nearly 5,000 reported grain elevator explosions documented by the 
American press since 1882.3 The volatility of grain dust may be a reality for elevator employees 
that must be contended with on a daily basis but for the uninitiated, the extreme danger posed by 
such dust is a surprising fact even though, as Mike Lyman commented in 1977, “Grain dust is 
about 50 times as explosive as coal dust.”4 To illustrate the power of this dust, press reports have 
often described elevator explosions in terms of war: “[the area] resembled the bombed-out 
buildings of a war-torn city,” or the blast reminded witnesses of an atomic bomb mushroom 
cloud.5 When the Continental grain elevator in Westwego went up in smoke in December 1977, 
                                               
1 Jack Coleman, Unprocessed Oral History Interview conducted November 17, 2017. Property of the T. 
Harry Williams Center for Oral History at Louisiana State University. 
2 Statistics from a search for “rice mill explosion” on newspapers.com as of January 27, 2019. 
3 National Materials Advisory Board, Prevention of Grain Elevator and Mill Explosions (Washington, 
D.C.: National Academy Press, 1982), 124. Statistics from a search for “grain elevator explosion” on 
newspapers.com as of January 27, 2019. 
4 “Ag officials quiet about Galveston reports on dust,” The Terre Haute Tribune, December 29, 1977: 11. 
5 “3 Killed, 33 Injured in Grain Explosion,” The Town Talk, April 8, 1981: 8. “5 Die in Silo Blast,” The 
Town Talk, December 22, 1977: 2. 
The Daily World quoted one witness as saying the elevator “went up like and H-bomb.” See 
“Grain Elevator Explodes; Workmen Tossed into River,” Daily World, December 22, 1977: 1. See also 
“20 Thought Dead in Elevator Blast,” The Daily Review, December 22, 1977: 11. 
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it became the single largest crisis in the history of Louisiana grain as 36 people lost their lives 
only a few days shy of Christmas. Charles Roemer noted “there were no realistic standards in 
effect” at the time to ensure the safety of grain elevator operations. It became vital for Louisiana 
with its high concentration of elevators to develop solutions to the dust hazard.6 The innovations 
to facility design and equipment that came about in response to the Continental explosion were 
implemented in elevators beyond the Gulf coast, setting national and international standards.  
 Occurring in the aftermath of the Cereal Heist investigation and the 1972 grain sales to 
Russia, the Continental explosion raised questions of sabotage and terrorism. The large-scale 
devastation from the explosion also raised concerns about facility design and construction since 
the Continental facility was one of many built with a concrete head house. If grain dust is a 
literal ticking time bomb of unpredictability, new designs and safety measures were needed to 
ensure the industry didn’t crumble under the weight of its own facilities. While some employees 
believed “you have a better chance of getting hurt walking across the street than you do in a 
grain elevator,” the loss of life at the hands of an explosion made the dangers of the industry 
more immediate.7 Dust hazards were only becoming more pronounced as the volume of grain 
moved through the Port kept increasing to meet global and domestic demand. New regulations 
put into place by the Environmental Protection Agency also increased dust problems within the 
elevators and it was a struggle to balance both sides of such a health and safety crisis: profits vs. 
protection.    
 As early as 1915, the issues of grain dust and combustion were being discussed by 
industry experts and government officials alike. In January 1915, the Times-Picayune wrote, “the 
                                               
6 “Army’s Aid Asked to Help Prevent Elevator Blasts,” Daily World, February 3, 1978: 8. 
7 “Grain Elevator Precautions Taken,” The Town Talk, February 28, 1979: 30. 
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same care employed to prevent coal dust explosions should be applied to guard against grain dust 
blasts.” The article goes on to quote a mine expert who commented, “We are forced to conclude 
that if an explosion with such terrible force and violence could occur at [the Husted Milling 
Company elevator in Buffalo], then the grain elevators of this country are at all times subject to 
the possibility of this occurrence, if favorable conditions exist.”8 The explosion in Buffalo in late 
June 1913 killed five men instantly while upwards of sixty individuals were injured with many 
later dying from those injuries. John Dickinson Sherman, writing for the Saint Charles Herald 
explained in 1921: 
The flat truth is that many kinds of dust are like so much powder - only more powerful in explosive force. 
Scores of substances quite harmless in the mass become highly dangerous when pulverized and blown into 
the air, with each particle surrounded by sufficient oxygen to burn it. Combustion, under these circumstances, 
takes place with explosive violence and destroys lives and property as effectively as dynamite or TNT. 
It takes very little to set off one of these tremendous explosions. An electric or friction spark, a lighted match, 
a flame of any kind - and an atmosphere full of powdered dust. Usually the primary explosion is slight. But 
this slight primary explosion shakes loose the accumulated dust from beam and sill and crevice. Then comes 
the big explosion. The little local explosion has aided as a sort of priming charge for the detonation that kills 
and wrecks. 
Sherman went on to note that “the more solid the construction the worse the destruction,” and 
this certainly proved to be true with the concrete Continental elevator.9 The Continental disaster 
was also made worse by the explosion pattern outlined by Sherman. 
         On the morning of December 22, 1977, the eyes of the nation were on the small town of 
Westwego as they watched the aftermath of the country’s deadliest grain elevator explosion 
unfold. Shortly before noon, while a ship was being loaded at the facility, volatile grain dust 
somewhere inside the elevator “was ignited and blew the tops off 43 giant silos.”10 According to 
one witness, “the blast started at the front and rippled backwards through the string of silos - 
                                               
8 “Grain Dust Blasts,” Times-Picayune, January 10, 1915: 32. 
9 John Dickinson Sherman, “Watch Your Dust, Lest it Go ‘Bang!'," St. Charles Herald, April 2, 1921: 4. 
10 The ship was reportedly undamaged by the blast. See “New Orleans silo blast toll reaches 31 as 
workmen continue removing debris,” The Sun, December 24, 1977: A6. 
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shattering the concrete tops and scatter[ing] debris and dust for hundreds of yards.”11 The blast 
had buried a two-story control house and lunchroom adjoining the elevator’s 250-foot tall head 
house and a majority of those killed were trapped inside. Commenting on the wreckage, the 
Daily World noted the little control house did not stand a chance once the nearby “25-story grain 
elevator exploded.”12 Compared with elevator’s predecessors from the early twentieth century, 
this facility was a monumental structure and half of it, 48 of the 73 silos, was decimated in a very 
short span of time.13 According to Michael Gavron who was working on the ship docked at the 
elevator at the time of the explosion, “In a matter of seconds, the main head house of the elevator 
had fallen to the ground and it looked like the inspection lab and control room where they have 
all their scale equipment was completely leveled.”14 
          When the Continental elevator was built in the 1960s, it was a reinforced concrete 
structure, as concrete had become the primary material used for all terminal elevators, no matter 
their location. For nearly fifty years, advertisements had proclaimed that concrete elevators were 
built to last or more simply “built for keeps,” and their fireproof nature was always at the center 
of any praise.15 Concrete was certainly fireproof in the sense of containing a blaze and 
preventing it from spreading, but that was exactly the problem on the morning of December 22, 
1977. The elevator was constructed in a way that added to the severity of the explosion and 
subsequent damage, as the facility was stacked with the control room above the conveyors and 
silos. It was a very geometric and somewhat condensed structure consisting of seventy-two silos 
and a 250-foot tall head house that served as the primary “elevator.” Inside the head house was a 
                                               
11 “Grain Elevator Blast Leaves 5 Dead Near N.O.,” The Monroe News-Star, December 22, 1977: 1. 
12 “22 Are Dead in Explosion,” Daily World, December 23, 1977: 1. 
13 “Number 1: 22 Are Dead,” Daily World, December 23, 1977: 10. 
14 “5 Die in Silo Blast,” The Town Talk, December 22, 1977: 1. 
15 See, for example, the advertisements featured in the first few pages of The American Elevator and 
Grain Trade XXXVI, No. 10 (April 15, 1918). 
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bucket elevator system where, as Tim Duncan explains, “grain gets put into buckets bolted to a 
belt…with a conveyor running up. It elevates the grain vertically and discharges it onto 
distribution conveyors that then drop it into the silos.”16 Evidence of this system is clearly shown 
in a 1967 press photo of the facility: the grain was carried from the river up the conveyor to the 
head house, where it was carried up in the bucket elevator, and then deposited for temporary 
storage. When the blast occurred, it triggered another in an adjacent area of the elevator and the 
structural support collapsed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For marine terminal engineer Tim Duncan, the legacy of the Westwego explosion is 
immediately evident in how it affects his work: 
It spurred a lot of design changes. It was an older design that utilized a head house design and bucket 
elevators, which are since – You try to get it . . . If you have the real estate, you try not to do that. You try to 
get the product elevated using more conventional belt conveyors rather than bucket elevators if you can. . . . 
bucket elevators had a reputation of just, a potential for problems with either fire or burned out bearings or 
whatnot. That, in this particular case, a spark or something can be carried from silo to silo to silo to silo. 
Boom. Boom. Boom. Boom. Boom.17 
                                               
16 Timothy Duncan, Unprocessed Oral History Interview conducted March 29, 2018. Property of the T. 
Harry Williams Center for Oral History at Louisiana State University. 
17 Ibid. 
Figure 3. 1967 Press Photo of the Continental 
Grain Elevator in Westwego, Louisiana. 
Historic Images Part Number: nob04921. 
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Research into grain dust explosions had been going on since the early twentieth century but 
elevator designs remained relatively the same until this catastrophic moment. The Public Grain 
Elevator in New Orleans was continuously praised in the trade press for its concrete construction 
despite an explosion there in 1938.18 While a strong construction material, it can certainly be 
argued that the concrete proved the fatal ingredient at Westwego because of its strength and heft. 
The compact nature of these elevators was also a key to the disaster because the explosion itself 
really had nowhere to go. In November 1978, the New Orleans Dock Board approved a $200 
million bond issue “to pay for the building of a bigger, safer facility to replace the Continental 
Grain Co. elevator.” This elevator, still under the operation of Continental, was expected to be 
fully functional by 1980.19           
 Only a few weeks after the blast, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
issued a safety alert to the industry outlining such safety measures as the grounding of electrical 
wiring and proper ventilation, as well as precautions related to worker exposure to excessive 
grain dust and toxic fumigants.20 OSHA Director Eula Bingham urged elevator operators to 
seriously reassess their existing procedures and carefully follow the alert’s recommendations. 
“Workers’ lives may literally depend on your taking appropriate action,” she said in a letter, 
adding, it is “the employer’s general duty to furnish a workplace free from recognized hazards 
causing or likely to cause death or serious harm to workers.” The OSHA alert stressed the need 
for a comprehensive maintenance program in all elevators to ensure all equipment was properly 
                                               
The Zen-Noh Grain Corporation elevator built in Convent, Louisiana in 1982 was designed to address all 
of the safety measures described by Duncan. 
18 One of the men killed in this explosion, George Herrle, had been employed at the elevator as a spout 
operator since 1917 when the elevator began operations. See “Funeral Services to be Held Today for 5 
Blast Dead,” Times-Picayune, April 6, 1938: 3. 
19 “Dock board approves $200 million in bonds,” The Times, November 10, 1978: 8. 
20  See, for example, “Chemical Fumes Are Fatal to 2 Men in N.O.,” State Times Advocate, October 10, 
1973: 1. 
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maintained. “Slipping conveyor belts on bucket elevators, hot surfaces caused by lights and 
appliances, [and] sparks from electrical equipment” could all provide the source for a deadly 
blast.21  
 In early February 1978, Louisiana Commissioner of Administration Charles Roemer 
appealed to the Army Research and Development Command to conduct a study of grain elevator 
hazards “because of [their] expertise in the field of accident prevention and explosion 
suppression.” Roemer hoped that such a study would offer some insight into how explosive 
conditions could be suppressed as well as what equipment could be installed to serve as a 
warning system should hazardous conditions present themselves. Studying the hazards inside 
grain elevators was especially important to those in the Louisiana grain industry because of the 
“high concentration” of elevators and silos.22 Most of the older elevators were built in a similar 
manner to the Continental elevator and others, like the Bunge elevator in Destrehan, were built 
perilously close to populated areas or public buildings. On September 23 and again on October 
10, 1970, the Bunge elevator suffered minor explosions. Seven men were injured in the first 
explosion and “chunks of concrete . . . were found lying at the entrance to the [Pecan Grove 
elementary] school grounds” 150 yards away from the facility. It was just lucky that the blast 
happened when the kids were not at school.23 
                                               
21 “Alert Issued for Grain Industry,” The Town Talk, January 6, 1978: 15. 
22 “Army’s Aid Asked to Help Prevent Elevator Blasts,” Daily World, February 3, 1978: 8. 
23 “Seven Injured as Blast and Fire Rip Grain Elevator in Destrehan," The Town Talk, September 14, 
1970: 14. “Westwego Facility Fourth Grain Blast Since 1970,” Morning Advocate, December 24, 1977: 
4-B. “McKeithen Gives Destrehan Area 3-Point Goal,” Times-Picayune, October 4, 1970: 8. According to 
the Picayune, there had been protests meetings and legal action taken to stop the elevator from operating 
because of the dust generated by the facility. 
In April 1970, two men had been killed at the Westwego facility when they were buried under 
tons of wheat after adjusting the rate of grain flow from one of the silos. See “Two Men Killed,” The 
Town Talk, April 27, 1970: 5. 
 
 
 
77 
 In the wake of these explosions, the Labor Department was urged to undertake an 
elevator inspection project. Their inspections revealed at least one safety violation in 75 percent 
of the elevators examined. With only 1,500 compliance officers nationwide, it was 
acknowledged that there was no realistic way for OSHA to effectively monitor and inspect the 
thousands of grain elevators in the U.S. along with the other industries they were responsible for 
monitoring. Eula Bingham said in July 1978 (not even a year after the Westwego blast), OSHA 
“will have to lessen the emphasis on grain elevators and intensify efforts in other high-hazard 
industries.” In response to the investigation of multiple elevator explosions in 1977, Bingham 
said, “Generally, OSHA’s investigators found that employers of the devastated elevators failed to 
maintain appropriate supervision over their workplace conditions.” In addition to dust 
accumulation and handling, investigators found numerous violations of the National Electrical 
Code, including the guarding of electrical circuits.24  
In less than a week, the Westwego explosion had become one of four, with others 
occurring in Texas, Illinois, and Mississippi. All together, these explosions took the lives of fifty 
people and injured fifty more. It was only a few hours after the Westwego blast that a pet food 
factory in Tupelo, Mississippi exploded, killing two men. An industry expert quoted by the Terre 
Haute Tribune suggested that “unusually dry weather and government regulations on ‘grain dust’ 
probably were factors in all four incidents.”25 For decades, part of the effort to reduce the risk of 
dust explosions relied on the expulsion of excess grain dust into the air outside the elevators. 
With the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1972, the Clean Air Act, and 
numerous studies linking this practice with increased instances of asthma in New Orleans, the 
                                               
24 “Grain Elevator Checks Uncover Many Violations,” The Town Talk, July 19, 1978: 2. 
25 “Ag officials quiet about Galveston reports on dust,” The Terre Haute Tribune, December 29, 1977: 11. 
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elevators were directed to internalize that dust and remove it with vacuum systems.26 Mike 
Lyman, director of engineering for Far-Mar-Co (the country’s largest grain marketing 
cooperative), told UPI in December 1977, “I put a lot of the blame for these explosions on the 
EPA because they say we can’t put a lot of this fine dust out in the atmosphere. We’ve had to 
revamp the (grain storage) systems and trap all this (dust) and go somewhere with it. Most of it 
goes right back into the elevator. That is the explosive element.”27  Recirculating the dust into the 
grain stream “improve[d] the feed content - and dollar value - of the grain,” but it also created a 
dustier, and therefore more hazardous, work environment.28 Felicia Kahn, a candidate for the 
Louisiana House, filed a civil suit against the Public Elevator in October 1975, charging that 
“dust and exhaust from the public grain elevator exceeds state and federal standards for clean air 
and endangers the health and environment of uptown New Orleans.”29 For seven years, elevator 
officials had negotiated with the community over improvements to their dust control, but dust 
was nonetheless still a public nuisance.30 In the aftermath of the Continental explosion, OSHA, 
the USDA, and the EPA all recommended “grain handlers stop the practice of recirculating grain 
dust inside their elevators.”31 If the weather on the morning of December 23, 1977 had been 
                                               
26 Hans Weill, Morton M. Ziskind, Richard C. Dickerson, and Vincent J. Derbes, “Epidemic Asthma in 
New Orleans,” The Journal of the American Medical Association 190, No. 9 (November 30, 1964): 811-
814. R. Lewis, M.M. Gilkeson, Jr., and R.O. McCaldin, “Air Pollution and New Orleans Asthma,” Public 
Health Report 77 (November 1962): 947-954. H. Weill, et. al., “Further Observations on New Orleans 
Asthma,” Archives of Environmental Health 8 (January 1964): 184-187.  
A 1982 study concluded that the grain elevator employees had an increased frequency of 
respiratory issues and “changes in pulmonary function [were] directly related to [their] level of dust 
exposure.” See P. Corey, M. Hutcheon, I. Broder, and S. Mintz, “Grain Elevator Workers Show Work-
Related Pulmonary Function Changes and Dose-Effect Relationships with Dust Exposure,” British 
Journal of Industrial Medicine 39, No. 4 (November 1982): 335. 
27 “Ag officials quiet about Galveston reports on dust,” 11. 
28 Michael Isikoff, “Cutting grain dust sought for safety,” The Decatur Herald, July 12, 1978: 26. 
29 “Suit Filed,” The Town Talk, October 15, 1975: 33. 
30 John Alan Simon, “Grain Elevator Violates Pollution Laws - Agency,” Times-Picayune, August 8, 
1976: 1. 
31 “Grain elevator Checks Uncover Many Violations,” The Town Talk, July 19, 1978: 2. 
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especially dry, the lack of moisture in the grain would have greatly contributed to the explosive 
conditions inside these elevators housing more dust than they had in previous years. 
According to John Graziano, special assistant for grain elevator investigation and safety, 
“The two elevators that exploded in [Westwego and Galveston] . . . the devastation was so 
tremendous it was almost impossible to reconstruct the evidence.”32 OSHA recommended a 
$116,000 fine against the company operating the elevator in Texas and a $47,000 fine for 
Continental. At a House Education and Labor Committee hearing, additional fines were 
proposed in response to six smaller explosions that happened in the winter of 1977.33 But would 
fining the companies and collecting their money actually do anything to increase the safety of 
these facilities?    
To improve safety and address the various violations that had been discovered, a new 
federal program was established requiring export elevator operators to submit “detailed safety 
plans to federal grain inspectors for approval.” If those plans were not submitted, the Federal 
Grain Inspection Service could cease weighing and inspecting grain at those facilities, forcing 
them out of business as they would no longer be in compliance with post-1975 inspection 
regulations. The plans needed to specify “maintenance, housekeeping, safety, security, and 
evacuation procedures” because these various procedures all contributed to an efficient and safe 
operation and showed sufficient preparation for emergency situations.34 Leland Bartelt of the 
Federal Grain Inspection Service additionally maintained that it was FGIS policy “to provide 
inspection and weighing conditions that will not result in serious health hazard, injury or death of 
any of our employees. We will suspend our operations at export grain elevators when we 
                                               
32 “Grain Elevator Probe Continues,” Daily World, February 20, 1978: 2. 
33 “Grain Elevator Checks Uncover Many Violations,” The Town Talk, July 19, 1978: 2. 
34 Michael Isikoff, “Cutting grain dust sought for safety,” The Decatur Herald, July 12, 1978: 26. 
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determine that drastic action is necessary to protect lives.” According to James Stanberry, a 
survivor of the Continental explosion, the elevator never completely ceased operations. “What 
blew up was where they stored the grain. They never even slowed down, I don’t believe. They 
kept right on going, man, loading them ships. Money. Money hunting.”35 
There was clear animosity towards the FGIS in official correspondence from Galveston, 
Texas prior to the explosion there on December 27, 1977: “Their attitude seems to be that 
Congress imposed the FGIS on them and that they have to have us around, but they don’t have to 
cooperate.”36 The chief USDA investigator issued a warning to grain inspectors “to leave 
elevators if the dust collectors break down on days when the humidity is less than 45 percent,” 
but what about the welfare of other employees?37 James S. Phelps, a grain inspection supervisor 
at the Galveston facility, had warned the FGIS and elevator management about excessive dust in 
the facility. One USDA official who had visited the facility described how the dust “piled up like 
snowdrifts against the walls,” and upon inspection, E. K. Bauman of the FGIS also found the 
“untenable hazard” of allowing welding to be done during grain handling operations.38 Failure to 
                                               
35 James Stanberry interview featured in The Continental Grain Elevator Explosion (dir. Royd Anderson, 
2007) videodisc: 33min., sd., col., 4 3/4 in. 
36 “OSHA Plans to Issue ‘Alert’ Outlining Grain Elevator Safety,” The Town Talk, December 31, 1977: 8. 
37 “Grain Elevator Probe Continues,” Daily World, February 20, 1978: 2. “Grain Elevator Guidelines 
Listed,” The Times, January 7, 1978: 2. “Attitude of officials at grain elevator hit,” The Times, December 
31, 1977: 2. 
Another report citing Bartelt claims he advised the industry that export elevators might have to be 
closed if a solution was not found, stating, “We cannot afford another tragedy.” See Thomas O’Toole, 
“Operators of Grain Elevator Were ‘Hostile’ to Safety Inspectors,” The Star Press, December 31, 1977: 7. 
38 Thomas O’Toole, “Operators of Grain Elevator Were ‘Hostile’ to Safety Inspectors,” 7. Some 
employees had been forced to wear masks while working because the dust problem was so bad. See the 
Associated Press, “Official: Grain Outfits Disregarded Inspectors,” Fort Lauderdale News, December 31, 
1977: 5. 
Phelps also reported “space provided by the elevator is weevily, has rats living in the ceiling and 
the air conditioner doesn’t work 75 percent of the time.” See Thomas O’Toole, “Operators of Grain 
Elevator Were ‘Hostile' to Safety Inspectors,” 7. “Attitude of officials at grain elevator hit,” The Times, 
December 31, 1977: 2. 
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heed the warnings of these inspectors led to the deaths of fifteen individuals, three of whom 
worked for the FGIS.39  
In several ways, the Continental explosion was directly linked to the major crises and 
scandal of the early 1970s. The Town Talk concludes the possibility of a deadly explosion was 
“worsened as agriculture exports increased [following the 1972 Russian sales] and elevators 
began to work at peak capacity.” In April 1976, the company had paid a $500,000 fine for short 
weighing ships in connection with the Heist scandal, and most of the inspectors killed or injured 
in the 1977 explosion were graduates of a “special school which was born of [the] grain 
scandals.”40 In an incredibly revealing statement, the Town Talk reported on December 22, 1977, 
five bodies had already been recovered “from the burning grain elevator and its adjacent offices, 
where government inspectors worked to prevent theft or fraud in the scandal-ridden grain 
business.”41 The FBI, still working on the last details of the Heist case, opened a separate 
investigation of the explosion. Although their investigation proved inconclusive, it raised 
questions of whether the explosion was a result of dust combustion, terrorism, or sabotage.  
 Val Cantu, an elevator employee told the Town Talk that the elevator had been on the 
receiving end of multiple bomb threats beginning in 1975. “When they had a bomb scare,” Cantu 
was quoted as saying, “people wanted to knock off (work) . . . (Then) the company decided they 
were going to put their foot down on people taking off when bomb threats were made. Not even 
a week before the explosion they had a meeting and said they were going to take disciplinary 
action. The following week - boom. I think the bomber made his threat good, I really believe 
                                               
39 “Names of Dead, Injured Listed,” The Galveston Daily News, December 29, 1977: 1. 
40 “Inspectors Had Graduated from Special Grain School,” Times-Picayune, December 23, 1977: 8. 
41 “5 Die in Silo Blast,” The Town Talk, December 22, 1977: 1. 
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that.”42 Louisiana Agriculture Commissioner Gil Dozier countered Cantu’s belief, saying, “There 
is a theory that sabotage was involved because of [various strikes] or the fact that grain 
inspection has been moved from the private sector to the federal sector. . . . Some people believe 
that human wrongdoing was involved . . . but I discount the wrongdoing. I don’t believe they 
will find there was an attempt to harm the elevators.” It was reported that Dozier was aware of 
the bomb threats, but determined that “from the nature of the explosion . . . a gas buildup is the 
most likely cause.” 43 One investigator also put forth the possibility that the explosion was the 
result of “a buildup of grain during the recent national dockworkers’ strike,” an incidental 
consequence not tied to sabotage. Dozier supported this notion, stating, “The strike, which 
slowed shipping at ports from Maine to Texas for two months this fall, may have forced 
Continental officials to hold on to their grain supplies too long. If you put any grain in an 
enclosure it’s like using the grain for mash and gasses are created. It’s not the grain that 
explodes, it’s the gasses that build up.”44  
 Dozier never offered a firm conclusion as to the cause of the blast, blaming a gas build up 
or a mechanical failure linked to the conveyor. “If mechanical failure let the conveyor run dry [of 
lubrication],” he said, “It could cause friction that would set off an explosion.” Perhaps it was a 
combination of factors. Although it is unlikely, sabotage has never officially been ruled out, 
meaning the explosion could have been an instrument of diversion from the Heist investigation 
that had thoroughly tarnished the industry’s reputation.45 Ultimately, the cause of the explosion 
                                               
42 “20 Thought Dead in Elevator Blast,” The Daily Review, December 22, 1977: 11. 
43 While others also discounted the idea of sabotage, the FBI did send three agents to investigate the 
situation, “just in case.” See “New Orleans silo blast toll reaches 31 as workmen continue removing 
debris,” The Sun, December 24, 1977: A6. 
44 “22 Are Dead in Explosion,” Daily World, December 23, 1977: 1. 
45 Even if the explosion was not a purposeful act of sabotage or terrorism designed to distract from the 
investigation, it managed to do just that. For many industry members who lived through the 1970s, they 
can recall the 1972 Russian deals and the 1977 explosion but the 1975 investigation is lost. Marine 
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can best be reduced to negligence of some kind whether in the form of improper housekeeping 
practices or discounting the bomb threats.46  
 For nearly a decade after the Continental explosion, industry officials had been in a 
deadlock with OSHA over new regulations aimed at preventing such deadly blasts. During that 
time, there were 190 elevator explosions that killed sixty people and injured more than 300 
others. Industry officials successfully fought the implementation of new regulations, citing a cost 
of more than $1 billion a year to the companies if such changes were made.47 Between 1970 and 
1977, there was a reported average of 9 elevator explosions a year which represents an extreme 
minority when considered alongside the thousands of elevators in the U.S. that continued to 
operate without issue.48 A reporter for the Town Talk, sharing the sentiments of industry leaders, 
commented, “Aside from the human factor, grain elevator safety is important to America’s 
balance of trade because $14 billion worth of grain exports moved through elevators on their 
                                               
terminal engineer Tim Duncan, when asked if he was familiar with investigation, responded with a great 
deal of surprise, “In the grain industry?!” The quick and collective amnesia related to the investigation is 
most evident in how the press commented in 1977 that Gerald Gallinghouse, the U.S. Attorney in New 
Orleans, “goes back to the days of the Great Grain Scandal.” In two short years, it would appear, the case 
was closed and all was well in the land of grain. See Bill Crider, “Gallinghouse Exception to Patronage 
Rule,” The Town Talk, September 27, 1977: 3. See also Timothy Duncan, Unprocessed Oral History 
Interview conducted March 29, 2018. Property of the T. Harry Williams Center for Oral History at 
Louisiana State University. 
46 One theory as to the cause was put forth by an insurance company fire investigator: “a foreman using a 
portable telephone hookup in the complex created a spark when he withdrew his metal alligator 
connection from the electrical box he was using for power. As the foreman released the clip, it drooped 
over a power switch on the box and created the arc that ignited grain dust in the area.” An additional 
theory put forth by the federal task force investigating the explosions was dust being collected outside the 
elevator in so-called “bag rooms” had been brought back into the elevator to mix with the grain for 
shipping. “The returned dust could be drier than the dust gathering inside the elevators and create a more 
hazardous environment.” See Times-Picayune, April 24, 1980. Thomas O’Toole, “Operators of Grain 
Elevator Were ‘Hostile’ to Safety Inspectors,” 7. 
47 “U.S. Government Agencies Place Different Values on Human Life,” Albuquerque Journal, July 16, 
1990: 4. 
48 Comptroller General, “Grain Dust Explosions - An Unsolved Problem,” 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/130/125953.pdf. 
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way to foreign nations in fiscal 1977.”49 The economics of the whole enterprise is likely why 
grain industry officials and government bureaucrats in the 1980s seemed to place a higher value 
on business than human life. Even though the federal government was not willing to assign 
blame to any specific party in the aftermath of the explosions, officials did suggest “the hectic 
pace of work at many export elevators had created a climate where safety might take a back seat 
to business.”50 In April 1980, the families of those killed three years earlier finally got some 
closure when Continental “agreed in principle” to a $25 million settlement.51 Citing 
Continental’s faltering sales in the decades after the explosion, Cargill acquired the company and 
took over the Westwego facility in 1998.52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
49 “Criticism of Grain Elevator Regulations Seen in Talks,” The Town Talk, July 10, 1978: 15. 
50 Thomas O’Toole, “Operators of Grain elevator Were ‘Hostile’ to Safety Inspectors,” The Star Press, 
December 31, 1977: 7 
51 “$25 Million Settlement in Grain Blast,” Times-Picayune, April 24, 1980: 2. 
52 Wayne G. Broehl, Jr., Cargill: From Commodities to Customers (Lebanon, NH: Dartmouth College 
Press, 2008), 124. “Cargill Timeline,” https://www.cargill.com/doc/1432078093613/pdf-cargill-
timeline.pdf.  
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THE BEST KEPT SECRET ON THE MISSISSIPPI 
 And I saw . . . ADM was buying Bunge. I saw some article. And they were saying in the fifties . . . ADM  
 has a storied history because in the 1950s, they had an anti-trust. And I’m thinking, “The grain   
 investigation is just gone. It’s not in the public domain.” Because they’re not . . . Here they got a merger,  
 and they’re talking about their terrible days in the 1950s having an anti-trust case. But they’re not talking  
 about pleading guilty to stealing grain in the . . . seventies. 
    -Robert Isakson, Co-Case Agent in the Cereal Heist Investigation, 19751 
 
          In 1982, the U.S. government elected to close five regional offices of the Federal Grain 
Inspection Service as a cost saving measure.2 The Fort Dodge, Iowa, facility only employed six 
inspectors responsible for “origin inspections and official weighing of grain” for 150 country 
elevators. Their work would be absorbed by a larger nearby office but some in the grain trade 
feared the move would just create a reprise of the conditions in 1975. “We’re concerned about 
what happens after the office is closed,” one trader was quoted as saying. “We’re worried about 
the closeness of grain operations to [federal] inspection and about the greater intervals between 
on-the-spot [federal] inspection.”3 A reorganization plan had been put into effect for the FGIS at 
all levels the previous year, resulting the elimination of 271 positions in 43 locations.4 According 
to the Des Moines Register, “One effect of the reorganization will be to eliminate the jobs of 
several top officials who played key roles in uncovering and correcting the corruption that 
permeated the inspection and weighing of U.S. export grain in the mid-1970s.” Congress had 
already eliminated the requirement that grain be weighed as it arrived at export elevators, 
                                               
1 Robert Isakson, Unprocessed Oral History Interview conducted March 24, 2018. Property of the T. 
Harry Williams Center for Oral History at Louisiana State University. 
2 Proposals to limit the number of FGIS employees working away from the port areas had been debated in 
1977, only a year after the grain inspection reform law was adopted. Proponents of such a limit argued the 
grain scandals preempting the reform had taken place at the ports. But, Senator Dick Clark argued, such 
limitation would only “open the way to possible ‘malfeasance’ ranging from grain thefts to improper 
inspections.” Plus, as Senator Clark pointed out to the Senate, 18 people had been indicted “in connection 
with offenses at interior markets” and 19 additional investigations were pending. See “Senator Wants 
Federal Limit On Grain Inspection Lifted,” Daily World, June 10, 1977: 10. 
3 “Grain inspection office in Fort Dodge to close,” The Des Moines Register, July 27, 1982: 13. 
4 “One grain inspector will be eliminated in Galveston office because of embargo,” The Galveston Daily 
News, October 28, 1981: 25. 
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arguing, “since outbound grain headed for foreign countries still is weighed, honest weights for 
foreign buyers are assured.” Without weighing both inbound and outbound grain, it seems 
unlikely that problems of short weighing would truly be caught or eradicated.5 As with the 
question of how much a life cost in the aftermath of the Continental explosion, how could these 
budgetary cuts to the FGIS only five years after it was created not be setting the system up for a 
repeat of the very activity it was created to police? Members of the grain industry had been 
arguing since the inception of the FGIS that the industry was “a victim of over-regulation.” For 
them, such personnel cuts were seen as a victory.6  
In 1992, Wayne G. Broehl, Jr. released the first in a hefty three volume series on the 
history of Cargill. This was one of the first thorough accounts of any of the grain companies and 
none have been produced since Broehl’s final volume in 2008. He notes in the 
acknowledgements for the first volume that he was granted “full access to all records and all 
employees” while conducting his research.7 The company’s corporate website fails to recognize 
their role in the 1975 scandals or the 1972 Soviet sales, choosing instead to emphasize the 
company’s expansion into other markets like flour milling and cotton merchandising. This 
suggests the records made available to Broehl, Jr. may have been intentionally limited to produce 
a specific historical narrative. In fact, Broehl characterizes the 1970s as a period of “great 
success” whereas those examining Cargill from the outside would probably be more likely to 
label it a period of “great scandal.” Certainly, as noted in the Peer Reviewer’s Note of volume 
three, Broehl, Jr.’s task was made all the morning challenging by the fact he was in part 
                                               
5 James Risser, “Grain,” The Des Moines Register, September 23, 1981: 8. 
6 James Risser, “Grain inspection agency to cut staff, do less regulating,” The Des Moines Register, 
September 23, 1981: 1. 
7 Wayne G. Broehl, Jr., Cargill: Trading the World’s Grain (Hanover, NH: University Press of New 
England, 1992), xiii. 
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chronicling a history still in the making. It is difficult to address all of the conflicts, especially 
personal conflicts, within a company “when the people are still alive and kicking,” but it seems 
thoroughly problematic given Cargill’s track record in the 1970s that Broehl focuses on the high 
ethics of the company’s leadership.8 It has been similarly noted by retired employees that 
Bunge’s legal team “has to approve anything that is shared,” indicating the industry would still 
prefer to remain out of the public’s purview.9 
 Broehl acknowledges that Cargill’s role “as the largest firm in [the grain] industry” 
resulted in the company becoming “a centerpiece of the testimony on the grain trade” in 1975 
and the second volume of his history dedicates an entire chapter to the case (the only known 
instance of such a substantial academic treatment).10 For a brief moment, the veil of elusive 
secrecy was lifted, but forty years later, it has been wrapped even more tightly around the 
company’s role in this landmark case. Broehl notes that the case initially focused on inspectors 
accepting bribes from shipping companies, emphasizing the bribes were not coming from the 
grain companies. Based on the internal records he was given access to, Broehl suggests Cargill 
was ahead of the investigation, having “quietly called in private investigators at [their] Houston 
terminal” and then asking them to look into the Baton Rouge facility. Cargill executives also 
supposedly made their “noninvolvement” public knowledge, available for quotation in any 
Minneapolis paper. A memorandum from the company’s president, Whitney MacMillan, dated 
November 5, 1975 makes explicitly clear that there would be no secrets within the company 
about any internal practices going forward. Challenging the company’s very own stance of 
                                               
8 Wayne G. Broehl, Jr., Cargill: From Commodities to Customers (Lebanon, NH: University Press of 
New England, 2008), xii. 
9 “Louisiana Grain History Oral History Collection.” Property of the T. Harry Williams Center for Oral 
History at Louisiana State University. 
10 Broehl, Jr., Cargill: Going Global, xiv. 266-293. 
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noninvolvement, it was indicated that “such secrets had been unearthed in the earlier 
investigations by the Company legal department of the practices at the Baton Rouge elevator, 
where, even after having been given explicit statements not to shade grades Company personnel 
had continued to do so.”11 According to Broehl analysis, Cargill found itself in hot water “before 
the late 1990s, when corporate exuberance elsewhere was heading toward enormous bubbles in 
the business system, with their excesses leading to the so-called ‘Enron-style’ management 
sleight of hand of unreal performance goals and results.”12 Yet, the Cereal Heist developed from 
such sleight of hand expectations in which elevator employees were given the directive to trick 
the scales as shipments came in and went out. 
 From a deal that they supposedly lost money on in 1972, Cargill apparently came out of 
the so-called “export explosion of the early 1970s” as a “capital-rich” entity overnight.13 They 
poured this money into a new elevator in Reserve, Louisiana, the largest on the Gulf coast, that 
opened in 1977. And, according to Broehl, they were at the forefront of explosion research, with 
the design innovation of inclined elevator legs supposedly originating at Cargill’s grain lab. With 
that in mind, it is a little troubling that Cargill is the company that swooped in and took over the 
infamous Continental site and its parent company. In 1972, Cargill and Continental were the two 
biggest grain companies with the most power. Could Cargill have withheld valuable knowledge 
from their main rival just to stand by and watch them fail? What Broehl’s history tells us is that 
the grain industry is still eager to conceal or spin parts of their history. Published at the beginning 
of the digital revolution and written for an academic audience, Cargill was probably counting on 
Broehl’s volumes having a very limited impact on their public face. The fact they are portrayed 
                                               
11 Broehl, Jr., Cargill: Going Global, 279. Emphasis added. 
12 Broehl, Jr., Cargill: From Commodities to Customers, xiv. 
13 Broehl, Jr., Cargill: From Commodities to Customers, 13. 
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as the victim in Broehl’s telling of the Heist investigation and their corporate website purposely 
dismisses the two biggest incidents of the early 1970s, of which they played a large role, 
suggests they are ready to pretend these events didn’t happen. Unfortunately for them, it is 
impossible to wish these things away (even though they have been very effective at erasing it 
from public memory) because of the visible presence of the FGIS. Explaining why agents of the 
FGIS must have a space within the export elevators of Louisiana in 2018 requires consideration 
of the upheaval of the industry at these three key moments of the 1970s.  
 The FBI investigation of 1975 could have happened at any other port but it was the Port 
of New Orleans and its role in international trade that made the case as significant as it was. 
Through the various scandals and crises that have flavored Louisiana’s grain history, the state 
has been given a central role in driving change for the industry as a whole. After Continental, 
facility designs and building materials have changed and certainly safety and housekeeping are 
primary concerns for all elevator employees. Not only is Louisiana responsible for a major 
portion of the country’s grain exporting business, it has been largely responsible for numerous 
changes to how the industry does its work. 
      Tim Duncan said it best when he suggested that the grain elevators of Louisiana quite 
literally feed the world.14 As early as 1955, The Times of Shreveport commented, “Today with 
modern farming methods and technological development, the American farmer is vitally 
concerned with foreign markets. Free countries of the world, too, have recognized this 
interdependence and have counted on foreign trade to help feed the peoples of their lands.”15 
Certainly, New Orleans found a central place in the system of foreign trade as early as 1718 
                                               
14 Timothy Duncan, Unprocessed Oral History Interview conducted March 29, 2018. Property of the T. 
Harry Williams Center for Oral History at Louisiana State University. 
15 “N.O. Elevator to Handle Billionth Bushel of Grain,” The Times, February 14, 1955: 3. 
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when the first grain was cultivated in the area.16 Yet significance of Louisiana’s grain industry 
has gone largely unnoticed by the greater American populace and the quick amnesia of the 
Cereal Heist of 1975 have rendered Louisiana grain the best kept secret on the Mississippi. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
16 The cultivation of maize in Louisiana began as early as 1710 with farmers selling 116 barrels of the 
crop to the government that years. See Lewis Cecil Gray, History of Agriculture in Southern United 
States to 1860, Vol. I (New York: Peter Smith, 1941), 66. 
See also Armando A. Calleja, “Agronomic Practices and Their Influence on the Development of 
the Louisiana Rice Industry,” (unpublished Master’s dissertation, College of Agriculture, Louisiana State 
University, 1938), 9. Lawson P. Babineaux, Jr., “A History of the Rice Industry of Southwestern 
Louisiana,” (Master’s thesis, The University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1967), 6. Steven Linscombe, 
"The History of U.S. Rice Production - Part 1," LSU AgCenter, December 8, 2006, 
https://www.lsuagcenter.com/portals/our_offices/research_stations/rice/features/publications/the-history-
of-us-rice-production--part-1.  The Rice Journal, XXX, 11 (December 1927). Mildred Kelly Ginn, "A 
History of Rice Production in Louisiana to 1896," The Louisiana Historical Quarterly 23, No. 2 (April 
1940): 7. Rice Journal and Southern Planter, (June 1913), 6. 
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